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as a state receiving a heavy flow of immigration. 11 Brownell16 the court had held that it was within the
c. Denationalization. The practice of states with respect foreign relations power of Congress to provide for loss of
to the application of denationalization varies greatly. Some citizenship by one who votes in a foreign election, this par-
states have no provision in their domestic law for dena- ticular case was overruled in Afroyim v. Rusk. 17
tionalization, while others, like Great Britain and some of Moreover, in the Mendoza-Martinez case, the court held
the Commonwealth countries, have provisions which that the provision for loss of nationality by remaining out-
relate only to naturalized nationals. Still others, like the side the United States to avoid military service was puni-
United States, 12 have statutory provisions relating to the tive in nature and could not stand constitutionally in that it
denationalization of both native born and naturalized na- lacked due process safeguards guaranteed by the Constitu-
tionals. tion. Finally, in Schneider v. Rusk, 18 the court struck
(1) In the U.S., Congress has provided that an down the provision for loss of nationality by a naturalized
American national shall lose his nationality for a variety of citizen who had continuously resided for 3 years in the
reasons. 13 The meaning of the statutory phrase "lose his country of his origin.
nationality" has, however, generated a certain degree of 6-5. Statelessness. a. Although, as noted above, inter-
controversy. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,14 the national law does not generally prohibit the use by states
court said: of denationalization, the undesirable result, i.e., stateless-
We recognize at the outset that we are confronted here with an issue ness, is a matter of great concern. In Staniszewski v.
of the utmost import. Deprivation of citizenship-particularly American Watkins,19 a "stateless" seaman was released after being
citizenship, which is "one of the most valuable rights in the world to- detained at Ellis Island for about 7 months at the expense
day," Report of the Resident's Commission on Immigration and
Naturalization (1953), 235-has grave practical consequences. An ex- of his employer. The court observed that the government
patriate who, like Cort, had no other nationality becomes a stateless per- was ". . .willing that he go back to the ship, but if he were
son-+ person who not only has no rights as an Americancitizen, but no sent back aboard ship and sailed to the port . . . from
membership in any national entity whatsoever. "Such individuals as do which he last sailed to the United States, he would prob-
not pmess any nationality enjoy, in general, no protection whatever, ably be denied permission to land. ... There is no other
and if they are aggrieved by a State they have no means of redress, since
there is no State which is competent to take up their case. As far as the country that would take him without proper documents."
Law of Nations is concerned, there is, apart from restraints of morality The court sustained the seaman's writ of habeas corpus
or obligations expressly laid down by treaty * * no restriction whatever and ordered his release: "He will be required to inform
to cause a State to abstain from maltreating to any extent such stateless the immigration officials at Ellis Island by mail on the 15th
1 individuals." I Oppenheim, International Law (8th ed., Lauterpacht,
1955), 5 291, at 640. The calamity is "[nlot the loss of specific rights, of each month, stating where he is employed and where
then, but the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any he can be reached by mail. If the government does suc-
rights whatsoever *" ceed in arranging for petitioner's deportation to a country
that will be ready to receive him as a resident, it may then
In holding that denationalization as a punishment is bar-
red by the Eiith Amendment, the court, in Troy v. advise the petitioner to that effect and arrange for his
Dulles, 15 said: deportation in the manner provided by law."
b. Similarly, in Public Prosecutor v. Zinger, 20 the court
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive tor-
ture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in ordered the release of a stateless person who had been im-
organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than tor- prisoned for failure to obey expulsion orders. The court
ture for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was cen- weighed the alternatives of releasing the man or imprison-
turies in the development. The punishment strips the citizen of his ing him "at the cost of the French taxpayer" for an
status in the national and international political community. His very ex- offense which he could not help committing, since he was
istence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to fmd
himself. While any one country may accord him some rights, and unable to leave French territory. The court concluded that
presumably as long as he remained in this country he would enjoy the "release is the best solution from the legal point of view."
limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is stateless. In the past, statelessness has resulted from a state's decree
Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might that members of a whole class of persons are no longer to
be subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short, be considered citizens of the state. During World War 11,
the expatriate has lost the right to have nghts.
Germany withdrew German nationality from Jews per-
(2) It is not only in Troy v. Dulles that the dena- manently resident abroad. In France, this loss of na-
tionalization provisions have suffered badly at the hands tionality relieved an individual from the strictures applied
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Although in Perez v.
by French law to enemy [German] subjects, even though
the denationalization law was repealed by the Allies at the
11. See generally, Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Na-
tionality, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1510, 1511-1516 (1960).
12. Immigration and Nationality Act, 68 Stat. 267 (1952), as 16. 356 U.S. 44; 78 s.c~.568 (1958).
amended 8 U.S.C. 55 1481-1489 (1958). 17. 387 U.S. 253; 87 S.Ct. 1660 (1967).
13. 8 U.S.C. 5 1481. 18. 377 U.S. 163; 84 S.Ct. 1187 (1964).
14. 372 U.S. 144, 160; 83 S.Ct. 554, 563 (1963). 19. 80 F.Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
15. 356 U.S. 86, 101; 78 S.Ct. 590, 598 (1958). 20. 11935-371Ann. Dig. 307 (No. 138).