Page 101 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

militias allied to war lords in the face of occasional power struggle within the movement.

When the war broke out in 2013, it was triggered by crises within the SPLM and failure to make
a transition to a political party with clear political programs to realize the liberation dream that
has historically remained elusive or far-fetched. In the words of Alfred Ladu Gore, SPLM biggest
failure was develop a democratic culture in the liberated territories together with its abuse of

civilians and contempt for those who did not share their vision. Therefore, for SPLM, it was just
business as usual after capturing state power. Although there were documents on development
such as SPLM: Peace through development: perspectives and prospects in Sudan (2000), such

policy documents could not be implemented in the context of war. AmilcarCabal’s theory of
national liberation assumed a significant role of the petty bourgeoisie and transformation of the
state and economic leading to full decolonization. The SPLM did not conceive any reconstruction
and liberation beyond capturing state power as we have observed hence a curse and a burden in
the eyes of the people and yet another false start for the liberation movement in Africa and South

Sudan in particular.

The second chapter considered the evolution and development of the SPLM as a liberation
movement in South Sudan from 1983 and 2004. The chapter focused on the internal SPLM
politics and challenges from within. This study sought to investigate how the movement has
addressed the social and national question since it captured state power. Chapter two noted

that the SPLM promoted an ideology of new Sudan and lacked legitimacy hence lost the moral
campus as far as liberation of South Sudan was concerned. Whereas the first civil war was
separatist, SPLM was nationalistic and reformist that involved an overhaul of the political system

through socialism and democratic transformation. The movement we noted encountered serious
political rifts as a result of two competing visions of liberations considered as unity versus
secession. The numerous leadership crises but specifically the 1991 split exposed the nature
of the movement and challenges of legitimacy from within. In 2005 when the comprehensive
peace agreement was signed, SPLM faced serious challenges of insecurity, underdevelopment

and poverty notwithstanding the support by the international community. The turning point was
the resurgence of the resurgence of the war in 2013.

The third chapter traces the evolution of the comprehensive peace agreement and the challenges that SPLM
faced in the course of the negotiations including navigation of serious political rifts within the movement
through a number of conventions in 2004 and 2008 respectively. The chapter concludes the notable

weaknesses within the movement had much to do with the manner John Garang conducted armed struggle
pacing greater emphasis on the military than politics.

In chapter four, we compared Sudan People’s liberation movement(SPLM) with other liberation in
movements in Africa in the context of Cabrals theory of national liberation. Furthermore, we noted the
character and nature of liberation movements in Africa noting their shared characteristics during and in

post liberation governance. Just as Clapham had observed earlier in 2012, liberation movements make bad
governments because of history of opposing colonial or imperial governments. Furthermore, they provide
fewer services but mostly importantly exposes autocratic behaviors in pursuit of the nationalist projects.
It is not without interest that many govern forever legitimized by their liberation credentials. This largely

defines the nature of the post-colonial state in Africa that is crises ridden and transcending the crises require
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