Page 100 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

The tendency has been to cling to power and use state power to oppress, and repress any dissent.
It has been harder for the liberation movements to run a government than wage war. Waging wars
has a single purpose of winning while running a government involves consensus building and

formal structures of governance and accountability as well as flexibility. There are competing
goals and policies in running a government as opposed to a liberation movement whose central
concern is mass mobilization against an oppressive regime to overthrow the government.
Furthermore, once power is acquired, there are competing factions over power, pragmatism, or

even pure ideology causing rivalry between those in power and outside power within the same
liberation movement. The SPLM, we noted exhibited the curse thesis and betrayal of liberation
movements in Africa as John Young, Mamdani and Clapham have concluded. The fact that South
Sudan degenerated into civil war soon after independence suggests serious leadership failure

at the critical juncture when its skills were actually required to propel the country towards the
discourse of peace and stability.

The SPLM and army share the greatest responsibility of the post-independence crises and
reconstruction failures. Power struggle within the movement lead to irreconcilable differences
between on one hand the former Vice president Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir on the

other. Their differences have historically polarized the movement leading to numerous civil wars
including the ongoing one after the failure of the peace agreement brokered by IGAD. Rampant
corruption and failure to deliver peace dividends of jobs, better lives, food, education, health
and social services have rendered the liberation of South Sudan a curse. What is more, people
expected democratic governance and freedom that frees them from rule of Khartoum regime.

On the contrary, kleptocratic rule thrived. Violent power struggles, violence among break away
factions, ethnically and politically motivated resource based conflicts became the norm. Power
struggle became ethicized making the SPLM a factionalized movement whose central focus was

survival and crises management. Judging from the intensity of the conflict, it is clear that SPLM
was not prepared for statehood and nation building.

We have noted that liberation movements have a program of action and post liberation agenda.
The SPLM lacked a realistic social, economic and political development and governance agenda
other than what was provided for by the troika and the United Nations. The SPLM simply

supported the liberal donor driven agenda(troika-USA, EU, IGAD, and Africa Union) because it
provided them the opportunity for rent seeking and entrenched them as the masters of the new
state of South Sudan (Biney, 2008). Just like any other nationalist movement, it swiftly embraced
a single party dictatorship with 97% of parliamentary seats.

The biggest failure of the SPLM is their reluctance or inability to transform the SPLM into a

professional army. Mamdani notes that the SPLM is not different from the white army except that
it has some semblance of command and control structure. Even then, it remained a factionalized
force composed of competing ethnic groups and affiliations including Shilluk, Nuers, Dinka,
Mandari, Acholis and Banya each with a war lord in command. Because of the militarized nature
of the struggle, power came from the military and SPLM was one of the factions. Such a body

would not convince any one of its liberation credentials and readiness to govern. Finally, all
the attempts at demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration failed with mushrooming of

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