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development more elusive. The liberal peace narrative targeting the interests of foreign capital
through Foreign Direct Investment creates xenophobia and resentment of foreigners and those in
control of the economy.
The SPLM government developed vision 2040 that seeks to build an exemplary nation, a nation
that is educated, prosperous, informed, tolerant, productive, democratic, healthy, safe, secure and
proud. While such a vision is welcome and desirable, Key to the reconstruction of South Sudan is
first securing the nation and reconciliation. Reconciliation requires that a new social contract is
entered into and a new political dispensation that is legitimate and acceptable among the people
of South Sudan. The first reconstruction agenda should provide physical infrastructure especially
of roads, bridges, airports and railways. Water, agriculture and energy must be provided to the
people as basic public goods aimed at revamping the economy. The SPLM has proposed energy
projects in Fula, Laki, Beden, Kuren and Kenyiti.
The point is to make the state a developmental one that provides for major public projects and social
goods in the short and medium term for the people to identify the state with the public good. The
government needs to modernize and diversify especially the economy and agriculture in particular.
Politically, successful national projects require strong national leadership and reconstruction.
Efforts that foster national unity, address legacy of conquest and violence and social political
initiatives that foster social cohesion and dialogue within and among communities are basic
reconstruction efforts that should be pursued vigorously organically. The past reconstruction
efforts in South Sudan points at failure at, at least five areas-disarmament, demilitarization, and
reintegration of former combatant and other armed groups. Furthermore, donors assumed that
independence equaled stability and accorded priority to areas that served their own national
interests while deferring critical issues as nation building, institutional reforms, historical legacy
and the social question so central for South Sudan to reduce armed conflict. The donors failed to
recognize that each reconstruction is unique as far as causes of conflict and conflict resolution is
concerned. They failed to consider initial economic conditions and underdevelopment in South
Sudan. Their policies failed to reduce the risk factors but instead multiplied them.
The increased inequalities between and within regions defined by regions, ethnicity, religion
and class that originally triggered the Anyanya war and the rise of SPLM was not factored in
the reconstruction and any efforts that reintegrates such social question would ameliorate the
existing social cleavages and tensions. Finally, any sustainable reconstruction of South Sudan
must dismantle structures of war economy and its elites that maintain interest in the protraction
of the conflict. The reconstruction model must thus maintain certain non-profitable production
units out of political and security considerations observes Castello (Castello, 2008).
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter started by tracing the post conflict reconstruction in South Sudan from 2005- 2013
when civil war resumed. In particular, it examined the neoliberal post reconstruction model
supported by western donors and implemented by the World Bank and why it failed or had
limited success. The peace agreement reached after the war was never implemented and the
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