Page 113 - Ray Dalio - Principles
P. 113

Just as all human bodies work in essentially the same way,
                       so do the economic machines in different countries. And just
                       as physical diseases infect people without regard to nationality,

                       so do economic diseases. So, while the policymakers were at
                       first  skeptical,  I  approached  my  conversations  with  them  by
                       looking  at  the  physiology  of  the  case  at  hand.  I  would
                       diagnose the economic disease they were suffering from, and
                       show  them  how  its  symptoms  progress  by  referencing  prior
                       analogous  cases.  Then  I’d  explain  the  best  practices  for
                       treating  the  disease  at  its  different  stages.  We  would  have

                       high-quality  back-and-forths  about  the  linkages  and  the
                       evidence.

                          Yet  even  when  I  did  succeed  in  helping  them  see  the
                       linkages,  the  political  decision-making  systems  they  had  to
                       work  within  were  dysfunctional.  Not  only  did  they  have  to
                       decide  what  they  would  do  as  individual  countries,  the
                       nineteen countries of  the European Union had to agree with

                       each other before they could act—in many cases unanimously.
                       There  was  often  no  clear  way  of  resolving  disagreements,
                       which  was  a  big  problem  because  what  needed  to  be  done
                       (printing  money)  was  objectionable  to  German  economic
                       conservatives. As a result, crises would intensify to breaking
                       points  while  Europe’s  leaders  grappled  in  long  closed-door

                       meetings. Those power struggles tested the nerves of everyone
                       involved. I can’t possibly convey the amount of bad behavior
                       these policymakers had to endure for the benefit of the people
                       they represented.

                          For example, in January 2011, a few weeks after he’d been
                       appointed  minister  of  economy  and  competitiveness  by

                       Spain’s new president, I met Luis de Guindos, a man I learned
                       to  admire  for  his  forthrightness,  intelligence,  and  heroic
                       willingness  to  sacrifice  himself  for  his  country’s  well-being.
                       The old government in Spain had been thrown out and the new
                       government  took  office  as  Spanish  banks  were  about  to
                       collapse.  The  new  Spanish  policymakers  were  immediately
                       forced  to  haggle  with  representatives  from  the  IMF,  the
                       European Union, and the European Central Bank (the “Troika”

                       as  it  was  called).  They  did  this  into  the  wee  hours  of  the
                       morning and at the end were required to sign a loan agreement
   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118