Page 114 - Ray Dalio - Principles
P. 114

that essentially handed over control of their banking system to
                       the  Troika  in  exchange  for  the  financial  support  they
                       desperately needed.

                          My  meeting  with  Minister  de  Guindos  took  place  the

                       morning after the first and most difficult of these negotiations.
                       With  bloodshot  eyes  but  a  very  alert  mind,  he  patiently  and
                       forthrightly answered all my difficult questions and shared his
                       thoughts about what reforms Spain should undertake to deal
                       with  their  problems.  During  the  next  couple  of  years,  over
                       considerable objections, he and his government pushed  these

                       controversial  reforms  through.  He  never  got  the  praise  he
                       deserved, but he didn’t care because his satisfaction came from
                       seeing the results he produced. To me, that is a hero.

                          As  time  passed,  the  European  debtor  countries  fell  into
                       deeper depressions. This led Mario Draghi, the president of the
                       European  Central  Bank,  to  make  the  bold  decision  to  buy
                       bonds  in  September  2012.  This  move  averted  the  imminent

                       debt crisis, saved the euro, and, as it would turn out, made a lot
                       of money for the ECB. But it failed to immediately stimulate
                       credit  and  economic  growth  in  the  countries  that  were  in
                       depression. Inflation, which the ECB was mandated to get to
                       about 2 percent, was below that target and falling. While the
                       ECB  had  offered  loans  on  attractive  terms  to  banks  in  an
                       attempt to solve this issue, banks weren’t taking them up on

                       the  offer  sufficiently  to  make  a  difference.  I  believed  that
                       things  would  continue  to  worsen  unless  the  ECB  “printed
                       money” and pushed it into the system by buying more bonds.
                       The  move  toward  quantitative  easing  appeared  obvious  and
                       necessary to me, so I visited Draghi and the ECB’s executive

                       board to share my concerns.
                          At the meeting, I told them why this approach would not be

                       inflationary  (because  it  is  the  level  of  spending,  which  is
                       money  plus  credit,  and  not  just  the  amount  of  money,  that
                       drives spending and inflation). I focused on how the economic
                       machine works because I felt that if we could agree on that—
                       most  importantly,  how  buying  bonds  moves  money  through

                       the  system—we  could  agree  on  its  impacts  on  inflation  and
                       economic growth. In that meeting, and in all such meetings, I
                       shared our  calculations as  well as  the important cause-effect
   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   119