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Baligate and All the Gates 111

“inner circle” and between party boss Baramuli and a former director of Bank Bali.
32
Amid his denunciations of Ramli as a “liar” and a “drug addict,” the DPR parlia-
mentary investigating team summoned Baramuli for questioning, insisting that he
was “clearly” involved. Journalists and observers packed into the gallery, cheering
33
and applauding, while parliamentarians grilled Ramli for four hours, all of which was
watched by audiences across the archipelago.
When Ramli began naming top Golkar leaders on national television, pressure for
resolution appeared to have reached an unstoppable momentum. But then the pros-
ecution began to stall. When members of the DPR demanded access to key sections of
the PwC audit—most critically, a “flow of funds” report—the state audit body refused,
arguing that the report revealed personal bank account information and its release
would violate bank secrecy laws. On September 20, the Jakarta Post described those
34
investigating the case as “impotent and incapable in pushing through the investiga-
tion to its conclusion.” One legislator said, “I have a feeling, a political one, that this
commission will never succeed.”
35
The danger for the transition in this stalemate was twofold. It postponed the
reckoning Habibie would face once implicated directly in Baligate, the likely culmina-
tion of continued investigation. Indeed, in the final days before the parliamentary bal-
loting, Habibie reportedly was “trying to move the investigation from the politicized
parliament to the more pliable courts, which are likely to delay hearings until after
the elections.” In turn, this end run risked an extraelectoral outcome if protesters
36
flooded the streets prompting military repression, even martial law. That same week,
opposition leaders threatened such demonstrations to break the deadlock while inter-
national donors froze further aid disbursements, hoping to force “full and prompt
disclosure” of the PwC report.
37
During these events, a synergy developed between the media and international
donors, particularly in the print press through editorials calling the stalled investi-
gation a government “cover-up.” Rather than rail against foreign interference, the
38
papers used the freeze on international aid to argue for a quick resolution. In an inter-
view with the Jakarta Post , economist Tony A. Prasetyantono warned that the donors
“are not playing around” and that cancellation of aid “would make the wheels of the
economy stop.”
39
Kompas took a similar tack, stating in an uncharacteristically blunt editorial, “It
has become clear that facts have been covered.” The paper then warned of the dangers
that a cover-up posed to investment, twice emphasizing the importance of pursuing
an immediate resolution “regardless [of] personalities” involved.
40
During the standoff, on September 23, media reformers secured the passage of a
new law protecting press freedom and the public’s “right to know.” Yet even as sup-
41
porters hailed this victory, countermaneuvers to keep Habibie’s damaged candidacy
alive continued to threaten a reversal of democratization that might have reduced
these legislative reforms to irrelevance.

The Military’s Campaign
At this juncture, the military reappeared as a dominant player. With thirty-eight

seats in the parliament and numerous ways to influence Indonesia’s political elite,
military leaders, when they took a clear position, could have a decisive political
impact. Aware of this reality, Habibie’s team courted General Wiranto, commander
of the newly renamed Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI),