Page 130 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

Baligate and All the Gates 115

The National Democratic Institute noted another development critical to the
new accountability and public engagement the media introduced into these debates.
In contrast to previous parliamentary sessions, “the general public was much more
attentive to this General Session because, unlike in the past, its outcome had not
been scripted in advance.” Asiaweek ’s Jose Manuel Tesoro noted, “Nor were delegates
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beholden to a single party, the long-ruling Golkar, as they were when the MPR met
again last November.” In short, events created a better chance for an open-ended
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contest.
Despite the barrage of criticism, Habibie’s bid for the presidency was still viable.
“In addition to Golkar’s 120 elected seats,” one journalist explained, Habibie was
believed “to have bargained for the loyalty of 50 regional delegates.” With his advan-
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tage in the Islamic anti-Megawati block, plus the thirty-eight TNI votes Golkar hoped
to win by adding Wiranto to its ticket, Habibie still held a winning margin. “Habibie
is actually politically dead,” an insider commented. “But Indonesian politics seem to
be very much lacking an ethical and moral [dimension].”
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Once again, however, public opinion, now openly displayed, had created new
checks on what MPR members could do. Even those in elected posts, emboldened
by a popular mandate, could not ignore signs that the country was unlikely to accept
another Habibie presidency. Kompas , providing one of these signs, conducted a poll
finding that an overwhelming 70 percent of respondents “rejected” Habibie’s speech
outright, faulting his performance in almost every area.
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Louder still was the message from more than ten thousand protesters who gath-
ered outside parliament as Habibie delivered his speech—a message punctuated by
Molotov cocktails and violent clashes with police. Simultaneously, at the Hotel Indo-
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nesia traffic circle, thousands of Megawati’s supporters threatened unrest, even “revo-
lution,” if she did not win the presidency. And at the Jakarta Stock Exchange, one
thousand people from the business community staged an anti-Habibie protest. That
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same day, the military faction tipped the scales against Habibie when Wiranto decided
not to join his ticket.
By the time that Habibie had finished his speech, the public display of opposi-
tion overwhelmed plans to keep him in the presidency for another term. On October
19, the day before the presidential vote, MPR delegates formally rejected Habibie’s
speech, an act tantamount to a no-confidence motion. Later that day, Habibie bowed
out of the race.
In the end, stacking the parliamentary vote in Golkar’s favor turned out to be
easier than controlling a liberated media and the response of a galvanized civil society.
As one Golkar analyst explained, “[I]t is not such a difficult thing to get the numbers
for Habibie in the MPR.” It would have been “quite another thing,” however, “to get
public acceptance for a five-year Habibie presidency.”
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Election Minus Habibie
Habibie’s exit ended—for the time being—the shift toward democratic rever-
sal, clearing a path for the chief opposition candidate, Megawati Sukarnoputri, to
capture the presidency. Even before the MPR rejected Habibie’s speech, observ-
ers were predicting that a Megawati victory was “the most likely . . . outcome.”
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After Habibie’s exit, moreover, and a failed attempt to fi eld Akbar Tanjung that
prompted one legislator to pull a gun, Golkar was struggling to find a viable presi-

dential candidate.
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