Page 127 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

112 Chapter 6

to stand as their vice-presidential candidate. As the presidential race moved to the
42
fl oor of parliament, the critical question became, Would the military again back Gol-
kar, as they had in the last six elections, or would they allow a transfer of power to a
new party?
After the humiliating referendum in East Timor that ended the military’s quarter-
century occupation, President Habibie had numerous enemies in army circles. PDIP’s
presidential candidate, Megawati, by contrast, had a solid core of support among the
generals. Even in his own party, Habibie was seen increasingly as a sinking ship. Yet
43
rather than working to ensure an alternative outcome that might be acceptable to the
78 percent of Indonesians who did not vote for Golkar, military leaders prepared to
quell the protests that would likely follow a Habibie victory. In short, TNI appeared
to be getting ready for the incumbent, Habibie, rather than the opposition leader,
Megawati, to win, bracing to defend an outcome that much of the public was likely to
view as illegitimate.
In a development potentially even more threatening to the transition, several
sources indicated that some within TNI were preparing to take control of the execu-
tive themselves—either indirectly, with General Wiranto as president, or directly, via a
state of emergency. Most significantly, in the final days of the incumbent parliament’s
term, before newly elected legislators could take office, military leaders and Golkar
allies began pushing for the passage of a new security bill, the polar opposite of the
liberal 1999 Press Law.
44
The State Security Bill, originating in the Ministry of Defense, would have granted
TNI broad emergency powers to assume the duties of civilian government, ban public
protests, impose curfews, conduct investigations and raids, seize private property, and
take control of the country’s communications. As opposition built, critics, including
students who again filled the streets, declared it more draconian than the recently
revoked Anti-Subversion Law.
45
During these weeks of lobbying, TNI was working the system from two direc-
tions. If Habibie won with Wiranto as his running mate and the country accepted
this outcome, TNI would have the vice presidency. If Habibie won and the public did
not accept him, the unrest would provide an opportunity to take power more directly.
Either way, a Habibie win with the new security law in place would greatly strengthen
the military’s position.
TNI faced pressure to get the bill passed quickly before more independent legisla-
tors could take office. A corresponding sense of urgency grew among opponents who
feared that the military would try to provoke violence to justify the bill’s passage and
then use it to cancel the next session of parliament.
46
The prospect of military control over communications gave members of the media
particular cause to fight the bill’s passage. Intentionally or coincidentally, news cov-
erage and sharpening editorials greatly amplified public opposition as the measure
made its way through the legislative process. When protesters finally took to the
streets, legislators responded, adding a requirement that the president seek legislative
approval before declaring a state of emergency.
This concession was substantial, showing the continued power of public protest to
shape the transition. Nevertheless, critics doubted that legislators would have either
the will or the ability to prevent such a declaration, and observers predicted that the
bill would pass easily. In a last-ditch effort, members of the media assumed a more
47
activist role. On September 18, as journalists joined the swelling demonstrations,
their editors organized a strategy meeting, pressing party leaders to take a formal