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Baligate and All the Gates 113

stand against the bill. In a move indicative of their influence, the following day Gol-
kar’s deputy chair, who had attended the editors’ meeting, announced that legislators
were inclined to delay passage “until the new House convenes.” Two days later,
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however, all four parliamentary factions voted to pass the bill.

Confrontation
On September 23, 1999, a day before its term ended, the outgoing legislature
passed the state security bill by unanimous “acclaim.” In a report on the vote,
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one newspaper highlighted “a widely-held perception that the new legislation was
approved under pressure from the [Habibie] government, and the military in particu-
lar.” Ironically, while the government, backed by the military, pushed through this
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legislation that would have empowered it to ban public demonstrations, it was mass

protest magnifi ed by media coverage that blocked the final step in the bill’s passage.
Before the bill could become law, President Habibie needed to sign it. On Sep-
tember 24, observers still expected him to do so. At this point, however, students
who had been massing since the day of the vote stepped up their rallies. As dem-
onstrations intensifi ed, thousands of protesters, joined by city residents, converged
outside the parliamentary complex. Similar rallies sprang up in other cities, and by
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that evening there were reports of demonstrators throwing stones and detonating
fuel bombs, soldiers beating protesters, and police fi ring tear gas and rubber bullets
into the crowds. Seven people died, including a fourteen-year-old and a university
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student shot in the head by a sniper while sitting with friends on a curb.
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The protesters’ key demand was that legislators rescind their approval of the bill.
Military officers responded by challenging the authenticity of the protests, claiming
they were instigated by provocateurs employing ruffians to disturb public order.
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Others, particularly General Wiranto, argued that the public simply lacked sufficient
understanding of the bill.
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The crackdowns ignited a fierce public backlash. On September 25, twenty-nine
student groups and civic organizations issued a statement condemning Habibie and
Wiranto for the deaths. The statement demanded both revocation of the security bill
and Wiranto’s resignation. Significantly, it also “called on Indonesians not to support
Habibie’s bid for another term as president.”
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While outgoing legislators had ignored the mounting opposition, pressure on
Habibie was more direct. At the height of the protests, he tried to defuse tensions by
announcing that he would delay signing the bill. A military spokesperson explained,
“The delay is to allow the dissemination of information on the bill so that people
will be able to understand and accept this bill.” State Secretary Muladi [one name]
explained that the delay would last only seven to ten days, long enough for the gov-
ernment to “socialize” the law. By the next afternoon, September 26, Habibie went
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further, stating that he was ready to give up the presidency, though only through con-
stitutional means, and was “willing to accept criticism through demonstrations and
other public protests.”
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This announcement was arguably one of the most critical moments in Indonesia’s
break from authoritarian rule. In any democratic transition, there is one paramount
question: Will the ruling party give up power? Until that moment when Habibie
expressed willingness to concede the presidency it was not clear, with the military
preparing for a state of emergency, that the new legislature would ever get the chance
to vote him out of office. In short, Habibie’s announcement marked the first real