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Sefer Chafetz Chayim םייח ץפח רפס
Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara ערה ןושל ירוסיא תוכלה
Kelal Zayin - Halachah 2 ד הכלה - ז ללכ

on this witness with the same authority as he would rely on two witnesses, י"שר שוריפכו בותכה וילע ךסיח אל יולגב התיהש
then he must divorce her and pay her her Ketubah. But if her silence is
construed as an admission of guilt she should forfeit her Ketubah, as it .ךתולעהב 'פב
says in Ehven HaEzer (Section #115, paragraph #6) if she admits to being
an adulteress she loses both the amount of her Ketubah mandated by law ארוקה 'פ ףוסב ש"ממ ונירבד לע תושקהל ןיאו
and the additional amount which her husband obligated himself in that ייוזבל ירש הינעמוש ינסד ןאמ יאה הליגמה תא
Ketubah. (Please see that reference).
םשו איטש אפייג םש י"שרב 'יעו ןישו למיגב
And if you wanted to create a distinction between monetary damages and
our case and say that in order to cause a woman to lose all of her rights רוסאש ונירבדכ םאו תרויג ןב החפש ןב וא חרסומ
to her Ketubah one would need absolute proof of culpability, I will refute וא םישנא הברהמ עמששכ וליפא לבקלו ןימאהל
your argument as follows: The circumstances that would forbid a wife to
her husband are parallel to our case. The proof is – that if her husband ןידה אוה אליממו( 'דו 'ג ףיעסב ש"מכו אצוי לוקש
believes this single witness with the same authority as two witnesses he 'סב 'ו ללכב יתבתכש ומכו ותוא אונשל רוסאד
must divorce his wife. In a similar sense, based on the Gemara Pesachim
(113b), we hold the same view regarding Lashon Hara; that if the speaker רובע ותוא אונשל רוסא לבקל רוסאש ןויכד א"י
is believed with the same authority as two witnesses, etc… (Please see that ןטק שויב אלו לודג שויב אל ותוזבל רוסא םגו הז
reference). From this we can deduce that it is not necessary to bring a clear
proof in order to forbid a wife to her husband. Yet even so, the Shulchan לע ךומסל ארמגה אכה הריתה ךיאה ןכ םא )ש"ע
Aruch cited above decided the law that if the husband does not believe this .םידיב ותוזבלו לוקה
single witness as having the same authority as two witnesses he can return
to his wife.
תואצויש ימ ירקמ הינעמוש ינסד טושפ הארנד
Now let us analyze this further and see how it relates to our subject. If this
witness lied, there is no greater sin \ crime than this, as the witness testified ,םימעפ המכ תוריבע רבועש תוער תועומש וילע
falsely and gave her a terrible reputation for which there can never be any לעש דע ךכ םעפו ךכ השעש לוק וילע אצוי םעפ
forgiveness. Furthermore, he also wanted to needlessly forbid this woman
from living with her husband. He had the brazen arrogance to make his וללה תוריבעה לע דושחל ריעב קזחתנ הז ידי
remarks directly to her and yet she did not respond to him and remained ירש ןכל ,דימת ועטי אל ריעה ישנא לכ יאדובו
silent. Nevertheless, we cannot assume (her silence was an admission of
guilt and that) the speaker’s remarks were true. All the more so in our case, וניאש ימ וליפא ותוזבלו ערל וטילחהלו םיכסהל
because the speaker made remarks outside of Beit Din that were Lashon ,םצעב וריכמ
Hara or Rechilut in the presence of the victim and the victim remained
silent, we cannot presume the victim’s silence validated the truth of the רבד השעש םדא לע עמשנ הרקמב םא ןכ ןיאש המ
speaker’s remarks.

And even according to the opinion of the Maharshal who argues with the 5 Rashi: that he was an adulterer.
Shulchan Aruch (in the cited Ehven HaEzer) as is brought down in the 6 Rashi: ‘Gimmal’ that he was the son of the harlot Girtah, (The Bach’s
commentary of the Beit Shemuel, paragraph #8, where he holds that a commentary: the son of the adulterer Giyurah and the adulteress Giyurtah),
woman’s silence is an admission of guilt, that only applies specifically ‘Sheen’ a foul smelling name – meaning that it was permitted to even
to the case of this woman, and that her silence is in fact an admission of embarrass his mother. Rashi quoting his ge’onim \ teachers: ‘Gimmal’
guilt because she should have spoken up. But in our case, where the issue meaning adulterer and ‘Sheen’ meaning imbecile.

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