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Sefer Chafetz Chayim םייח ץפח רפס
Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara ערה ןושל ירוסיא תוכלה
Kelal Zayin - Halachah 2 ד הכלה - ז ללכ

will help somewhat to remove people’s mistaken impression (about this ירה 'וכו ותעומש תמחמ םישייבתמ ויריבחש וא
law). I will also include in this discussion details of the esur of accepting
1
Rechilut as truth so that I won’t have to repeat them a second time later on ןושל לכה תונושל ראש ןכו ,ושייבתנש בתכ אלש
in the second half of this sefer dealing with the laws of Rechilut. עמשנ םימעפ המכש תורוהל ,רבע ןושל אלו הוה
One of the proofs to what I explained above is clarified in the 2 Kelal ז"י ןירדהנסב ורמאש ןינעכו ,הז לע רבעש וילע
nd
nd
(in the 2 notation of the Be’er Mayim Chayim), that it is forbidden to
believe Lashon Hara and Rechilut even if the remarks are made in the ןיידעש םיאבנתמ ביתכ אכה ואבנתיו ביתכ םתה
presence of three people or even if the remarks are made directly to the .ןה םיאבנתמ
“victim,” because these two cases are inclusive of the same law, as I wrote
above. Another proof comes from the Rambam in the 7 perek of Hilchot
th
rd
De’Aut. In the very beginning of the 3 halacha he writes that Chazal have יאה ןכ םג בתכש ןיואל ג"מסב ןכ םג עמשמ ןכו
taught three people are killed by Lashon Hara, the speaker, the listener אציש הז לע בתכו הינעמוש ינסד ןאמ יאה ארמימ
who believes those remarks and the victim; and the listener is punished
th
more severely than the speaker. Then right after that, in the 5 halacha, he יאדוד ג"מסה תנוכש חכומו ,יאדוב ער םש וילע
writes – “whether one speaks Lashon Hara directly to the victim or makes ותוזבל רתומ אהיש ךומסל ןיא אמלעב לוק לע
his remarks without the victim being present” – the implication being that
in all circumstances it is also forbidden to believe it and we’ve explained ו"כ( תובותכמ םגו ל"נה הדנד ארמגמ עמשמדכ
before that the Rambam includes both Lashon Hara and Rechilut in this םג עמשמ היניקסאו דחא דע אתאו ארמגב )ב"ע
law.
כ"או םש י"שריפש ומכ דחא דעמ ערג לוקד ןכ
Truthfully, this concept is crystal clear, that even if we presumed that היבוטד השעמב )ב"ע ג"יק( םיחספב ןנירמאד ןויכ
Lashon Hara is permitted when it is not spoken directly to the victim if
the speaker knows that he would certainly have said his comments when ןינעלמ ץוח ללכ ךומסל ןיא דחא דע ירבד לעד
the victim was present to hear them, that presumption is relevant only to ףיסוה ןכ לע אמלעב לוק לע ןכש לכ ןוממ תעובש
the speaker because he knows the remarks are true and he would have
no hesitancy telling them directly to the victim. But that presumption המכ ידי לע ררבתנש 'יפו יאדווב תבית ג"מסה
does not apply to the listener who does not know if the remarks are true. םירבד ןיעכ אוהו דימת וב ןיאורש םירעוכמ םירבד
And just because the speaker was brazen enough to make his defamatory
remarks directly to the victim, would that be a basis for the listener to ל"נכו דימת וילע עמשנש וא הז ןינעל םירכינה
believe the remarks were really true? .י"שר שוריפל

In order that your Yetzer Hara not cause you to make a mistake – and you
would go looking for leniencies to allow this “listening,” and build these )ז"ט ףדב( ק"ומב ש"ממ ונירבד לע תושקהל ןיא ןכו
leniencies on thin air, by rationalizing and saying “How can I not believe
this speaker of Lashon Hara or this gossip? If it was a lie, how could he 'ר קפנ רתסב היהי הרות ירבדש רמאו שרדש יברב
'רל ז"יע ףזנו דפקיאו יבר עמש אקושב שרדו אייח
Here, in the context of the halachot of this Kelal, the Chafetz Chayim is
specifically addressing Rechilut conveyed in the presence of Plony (the person single witness who testified the man was a Kohein and his privileges were
who initiated the remarks or the action directed against the “victim”) and he reinstated. Rashi points out that a single witness’ testimony is stronger
is not addressing the concept of the general acceptace of Rechilut as truth. than a rumor.

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