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Sefer Chafetz Chayim םייח ץפח רפס
Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara ערה ןושל ירוסיא תוכלה
Kelal Zayin - Halachah 12 ט הכלה - ז ללכ

evidence does not have the same authority as witness testimony that ארבסה אתא אלד טושפ ל"נכ .םירבדב ותוזבל )כ(
would permit administering punishment to someone in order to recover
stolen property, just as it does not have the authority to allow the seizure תאנוא לש אתיירואד רוסיא עיקפהל ומות יפל חיסמד
of someone’s financial assets. Even if the circumstantial evidence is so )ב"ע ח"נ( אעיצמ אבבב ןנירמא ירהד עדתו ,םירבד
compelling as to be proof positive (still it cannot be a basis for causing
a financial loss to someone) as the Choshen Mishpat codifies this law הזו ופוגב הזש ןוממ תאנואמ םירבד תאנוא הלודגד
in section #408, paragraph #2. (Please see that reference). See also the לע ןניכמס אל יאדוב ןוממ ןינעלד ןויכו 'וכו ונוממב
responsa of the Maharik, in section #129, where he writes that this is
parallel to the law in cases of capital crimes where we find in Gemara אבבב אתיאדכו אנוממ יעוקפאל ומות יפל חיסמד ארבס
Sanhedrin (37b) “(a witness said I saw) someone running after another ןינעל המכו המכ תחא לע ארמגב ש"יע )ב"ע ד"יק( אמק
person into an abandoned house. I ran after him and found a sword in his
hand and the victim was writhing in his death throes and his spilled blood .םירבד תאנוא
was still dripping.” This is still not sufficient grounds for executing this
person. So too is the law in this case regarding the seizure of someone’s הטונ השולקה יתעד ןכ םג ירת יבכ היל ןמיהמ ןינעלו
financial assets, that even if our assessment was as compelling as the
conclusive incriminating evidence in this example, still we could not seize םאש םוקמב וליפא הז םושמ ותונוהל רתוה אלד רתוי
his property because Hashem instructed us (Devarim 19:15) “(only) on וישכע םוקמ לכמ ותונוהל רתומ היה רבדה ררבתנ היה
the testimony of two witnesses (in Beit Din).” I quoted the Maharik’s
complete responsa at the end of this sefer. And here the circumstantial ףא ירת יבכ ןמיהמ ידי לע םא יכ רבדה ררבתנ אלד ןויכ
evidence was much stronger than in the example of the case of Mar Zutra אמלא הז םושמ ותוא אונשל םיחספב ארמגה הריתמד
(and still we cannot cause this person to suffer a financial loss)! Thus
we are forced to conclude that the reason for Mar Zutra’s actions was אל ןכ יפ לע ףא ,יאדול ותעדב רבדה טילחהל רתומד
dictated by the special needs of the circumstances at that moment, as I קר ללכ רבד םוש ול השוע וניא םתהד ,וננינעל ימד
wrote above.
המ ,דיזמב השעש הריבעה רובע ובלב ותוא אנוש אוהש
But all of this is relevant only in the context of a Beit Din, as only the ותוא תוזבל ונייהד לעופב אתועיר ול תושעל ןכ ןיאש
Beit Din has the authority to go beyond the law based on the needs of
the moment. However, for an individual to do this under these same ק"ירהמ בתכש ןינעכו ,ירת יבכ היל ןמיהמ םעטמ םידיב
circumstances, even if the circumstantial evidence he had made it a ןינעל קר ירת יבכ ןמיהמ ןנירמא אלד ד"פק שרושב
certainty that this person stole from him and even if he had witnesses
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that would validate the item was his, even so he would be forbidden to ,םירחאל הזב דיספהל אל לבא ומצע לע השאה רוסאל
hit or hurt this person. He could not say that he himself is like a judge in .םירבד תאנוא ןינעל היתווכד ימנ יכהו
this matter, based on the concept that a person may execute the law and
act as a judge on his own behalf when he sees his own property in another
person’s hands and he can prove that the object is his. This is because even )ב"ע ד"יק( ק"במ ל"נכו .ןוממב ז"ע ודיספהל )אכ(
a judge may not hit another person in such a case according to the law, and .ותוכהל ןידה אוהד טושפו
the Torah only gives special authority to do so if the times necessitate it
and only to a qualified judge but not to an individual, as we find in Gemara
Sanhedrin (46a) and at the beginning of the cited Choshen Mishpat. With
G‑d’s help I subsequently found this idea in Sefer Torat Chayim, that the
pious Mar Zutra was only a judge in this case.

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