Page 191 - V3
P. 191
Sefer Chafetz Chayim םייח ץפח רפס
Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara ערה ןושל ירוסיא תוכלה
Kelal Zayin - Halachah 13 ט הכלה - ז ללכ
Daily Halacha: 3 Kislev, 3 Nissan, 3 Av; Leap Year-6 Kislev, 15 Adar II, 25Tammuz ןויע ךירצ הז ןפואב וליפאו .ןכ םירמוא יתעמש קר יאדו
Mekor Hachayim ,ח"מבב 'ט ק"ס 'ט ללכ 'ב קלחב ןמקל ונבתכש המב 'יעו
K7/13. However there are certain exceptions when the Beit Din ול ררבתיש דע רבדה תא הלחתמ רוקחיש בוט רתויו
does have the authority (32) (to impose a financial penalty or ןודינהל החכוה ול ליעומ היהי אלש עדי םגו ,אוה תמאש
loss) because of the needs of the moment (i.e., the circumstances ןמקל ןייע הזל ךירצש םיטרפה רתיו ,ומצע ןיבל וניב
are urgent). For example, someone appeared before the court
complaining that he was robbed and based on strong circumstantial .'ט ללכ 'ב קלחב
evidence he determined that so and so was definitely the thief, and
the Beit Din sees that evidence, or witnesses testified before the Beit אוהו ירת יבכ היל ןמיהמ אוה ול רפסמה םא ןינעלו
Din describing the circumstantial evidence. Under these conditions, ךליל ךכ רחא הצור אוהו ,וריבחל םדא ןיבש םירבדב
the Beit Din has the authority to mete out punishment to the suspect דדצל רשפא אנידלד ףא ,תמאל אנקל ידכ םירחאל רפסלו
(and coerce him to admit he was the thief). But an individual has
no such prerogative. Nor does Beit Din have this prerogative if the ונבתכש ירחא םוקמ לכמ ,ומצעב האר םא ומכ רתומד
circumstantial evidence is only claimed by the complaining litigant אכיל אתשהד הטונ תעדהש 'ו ללכ תוליכר תוכלהב ןמקל
but is not (independently) clearly proven.
רוקחל הלחתמ רהזי ןכ לע ירת יבכ היל ןמיהמד אנידל
שיש 'ט ללכ 'ב קלחב ןמקל ןייעו ,אוה תמא םא רבדה תא
Be’er Mayim Chayim דחא השעש הלוע רבד ומצעב האר םא וליפא םיטרפ המכ
(K7/13/1)-(32).. Beit Din does have the authority: This is .הזב ןכש לכו תמאל אנקל ךירצ יתמ וריבחל
derived from the incident involving Mar Zutra cited above and from
my commentary in the immediately preceding 31 notation. What I ןיב קוליח ןיא יתבתכש ולא םיפיעסה ינש לכד דוע עדו
st
wrote above “…based on strong circumstantial evidence, he determined
definitely…” even though in the source gemara involving Mar Zutra the טרפהמ דבל וריבחל םדא ןיב ןינעל םוקמל םדא ןיב ןינע
circumstantial evidence was flimsy, as Mar Zutra saw a student merely .ל"נכו תצקמב וב יתקפקפש םירחאל רופיס לש
wiping his hands on another student’s shirt (in disregard of a fellow Jew’s
property ‑ and he said “he is the thief!”). (Then why is this gemara a
source for our law requiring strong circumstantial evidence?) One must
say that it is obvious that the gemara’s case is not comparable to our case,
as there the Rosh comments on the case in the gemara that it was already 14 Translator’s note: 4 Adar Aleph 5763: Rabbi Yaakov Konigsberg (Yeshivat
known that a member of the household was the thief and since there was Mikdash Melech, Brooklyn) gave an insight (a peshat) to this statement of
no other circumstantial evidence pointing at any other member of Mar the Chafetz Chayim “except for the detail of” regarding the two halachot
of “believable with the same authority as two witnesses” and “believable
Zutra’s household and everyone else had a presumption of legitimacy and incidentally,” that if the sin was between man-and-G-d and occurred once,
there was some tenuous circumstantial evidence pointing at this particular then one must assume the “victim” did Teshuvah and the story may not be
student, then most certainly Mar Zutra had a basis for considering this repeated. But if the sin was between man-and-man, and was committed
“strong circumstantial evidence” and accusing that student and nobody once (as an example, money was reportedly stolen – and the money was
else. But that is not so in our case! Flimsy circumstantial evidence cannot not refunded) then someone who strives to determine the truth may repeat
be a basis for accusing a person of stealing something because we are the story in order to assist the wronged party.
certain that if we investigated everyone in the city, we would find many
181 152
volume 3 volume 3
