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reasonable suspicion puzzle. For example, in Smith’s argument boils down to disagreeing with
Pack, we considered the fact that the defendant Officer Solomon’s decision to wait until the in-
and his girlfriend “were traveling along a drug depth background checks finished before
trafficking corridor.” Similarly, we considered the deploying Krash. He offers no legal authority
fact that the defendants were traveling on a showing this ten-minute period was unreasonable.
“known drug-trafficking corridor.” Rather, he suggests it was unreasonable because,
when Solomon finally did conduct a sweep with
6 Thus, to the extent Smith argues that we cannot Krash, it took “only a minute or two.” He
consider his presence on I-55, he is incorrect. articulates no other reason.
Smith’s travel on I-55 supports reasonable
suspicion on these facts. But “post hoc evaluation of police conduct can
almost always imagine some alternative means by
Finally, we note that by 6:10 p.m., Officer which the objectives of the police might have
Solomon knew that one of the vehicle’s occupants been accomplished.” United States v. Sharpe, 470
had an outstanding arrest warrant for a parole U.S. 675,686–87 (1985). “[T]he fact that the
violation. This fact could have contributed to protection of the public might, in the abstract,
Officer Solomon’s reasonable suspicion. have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means
does not, itself, render the search
In sum, the record supports Officer Solomon’s unreasonable.”Id.at 687 (quoting Cady v.
reasonable suspicion, based on his experience, Dombrowski,413 U.S. 433,447(1973)). The
“that criminal activity ‘may [have been] afoot.’” appropriate inquiry “is not simply whether some
The record establishes this reasonable suspicion other alternative was available, but whether the
arose by 6:12 p.m. We therefore conclude that the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize
extension of the stop beyond that time so that or to pursue it.”
Officer Solomon could conduct a narcotics
investigation did not violate the Fourth The record does not suggest that Solomon
Amendment. unreasonably dragged the investigation out.
Rather, during the ten-minute interval Smith
Finally, Smith argues that, even if it was challenges, the record shows that Solomon was
reasonable for Officer Solomon to begin a waiting for in-depth background checks on all
narcotics investigation, that investigation was three men, as well as trying to secure consent to
unreasonably extended by Officer Solomon’s search the vehicle.
decision to wait until 6:21 p.m. to have Krash
conduct the drug sweep. In Smith’s view, Officer For those reasons, we conclude Officer Solomon
Solomon should have immediately deployed did not act unreasonably by waiting until 6:21
Krash at 6:11 or 6:12 p.m. rather than “[sitting] p.m. to deploy Krash for the drug sweep.
7
around idly” until 6:21p.m. The district court * * *
performed no independent analysis n this issue, After viewing the totality of the circumstances,
but concluded it did “not find the time from when we conclude that the district court’s decision to
the investigation began until Krash was deployed deny Smith’s motion to suppress is supported by a
to be an unreasonable delay.” reasonable view of the evidence in the record. See
Massi, 761 F.3d at 520.
We agree with the district court that the delay was
not unreasonable under the circumstances. The district court’s judgment is therefore
May/June 2020 www.texaspoliceassociation.com • (512) 458-3140 21
