Page 29 - May June 2020 TPA Journal

individual being stopped is engaged in
Glover and the dissent also contend that adopting wrongdoing.” Here, Deputy Mehrer possessed no
Kan sas’ view would eviscerate the need for exculpatory information—let alone sufficient
officers to base rea sonable suspicion on “specific information to rebut the reasonable infer ence that
and articulable facts” partic ularized to the Glover was driving his own truck—and thus the
individual, because police could instead rely stop was justified.
exclusively on probabili ties. Their argument
carries little force. As an initial matter, we have For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
previously stated that offic ers, like jurors, may judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court, and we
rely on probabilities in the reasonable suspicion remand the case for further proceedings not
context. Moreover, as explained above, Deputy inconsistent with this opinion.
Mehrer did not rely exclusively on probabilities. Kansas v. Glover, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 18-
He knew that the license plate was linked to a 556, April 6th, 2020.
truck matching the observed vehicle and that the ***************************************
registered owner of the vehi cle had a revoked ************************
license. Based on these minimal facts, he used
common sense to form a reasonable suspicion that
a specific individual was potentially engaged in PROBABLE CAUSE – BLOOD DRAW
specific crim inal activity—driving with a revoked
license. Traffic stops of this nature do not delegate Jonathan Forbes sued Deputy Lucas Paige for
to officers “broad and unlim ited discretion” to alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
stop drivers at random. Nor do they al low officers violations, arguing, among other things, that
to stop drivers whose conduct is no different from Deputy Paige arrested Forbes and subjected him
any other driver’s. Accordingly, combining to a blood draw in violation of his constitutional
database information and commonsense rights. The district court granted summary
judgments in this context is fully conso nant with judgment in favor of Deputy Paige. We agree that
this Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents. Forbes fails to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact and thus affirm.
This Court’s precedents have repeatedly affirmed
that “‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth In the wee hours, around 2:30 a.m., Deputy Paige
Amendment is “rea sonableness.”’” Under the observed a “brand new Corvette” in the far-right
totality of the circumstances of this case, Deputy lane of the Hardy Toll Road in Houston. He
Mehrer drew an en tirely reasonable inference that claims the car was swerving, so he initiated his
Glover was driving while his license was revoked. dashboard camera. Deputy Paige drove closer to
We emphasize the narrow scope of our holding. the Corvette, with both cars traveling about sixty
Like all seizures, “[t]he officer’s action must be miles per hour in a sixty-five mile per hour zone.
‘justified at its in ception.’” “The standard takes As Deputy Paige approached the Corvette from
into account the totality of the circumstances—the the middle lane, the sports car shifted gears and
whole picture.” As a result, the presence of sped away. Deputy Paige flipped on his lights and
additional facts might dispel reasonable suspicion. siren and pursued the fleeing vehicle, reaching a
For example, if an officer knows that the top speed of 109 miles per hour before the
registered owner of the vehicle is in his mid- Corvette pulled over on the right shoulder of the
sixties but observes that the driver is in her mid- highway.
twenties, then the totality of the cir cumstances
would not “raise a suspicion that the particular Deputy Paige approached the driver and asked

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