Page 30 - EducationWorld January 2023

Expert Comment

Settle Sino-India border

through compromise

SUDHEENDRA KULKARNI

UNE 2020: GALWAN VALLEY, LADAKH. December Can one-sided claims or a ‘no-
2022: Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh. In the absence
of a mutually agreed permanent boundary, every compromise’ stance by either India or
Jtime there is a military clash at any point along the China guarantee peace along the LAC,
3,488-km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC), between In-
dia and China, the trust deficit between our two countries much less cooperation between our two
grows wider. The media and social media in both countries civilizational nations that can shape a
exacerbate hostility between the world’s most populous
countries. Opposition parties in India train their guns on new world order?
government.
This does not happen in China because it doesn’t have cluding Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who, subsequently as prime
opposition parties. Yet each time there’s a confrontation minister changed his views on this matter) were stridently
on the LAC and soldiers are killed or injured, the same two opposed to any land concession to China. In an illuminating
questions repeat themselves in the minds of those who paper titled Nehru-Zhou Enlai Summit of 1960: A Missed
want peace and cooperation between Asia’s biggest coun- Opportunity?, historian Srinath Raghavan writes: “Nehru
tries which co-existed in peace and harmony for 2000 years was pushed to a position where his diplomatic manoeu-
before the 1962 border war in the north-east. How long will vrability was severely curtailed. Henceforth he had to con-
this confrontation go on? And can the boundary dispute be stantly assess what the political marketplace would bear
settled once and for all? and adopt only those policies that could conceivably be sold
The second question can be answered easily. And if the to the public.” Nehru himself voiced his fear: “If I give them
second question is answered to the satisfaction of both (Chinese) that (Aksai Chin), I shall no longer be prime min-
countries, the first becomes redundant. ister of India — I will not do it.”
The best opportunity to settle the dispute — in the west- hat was indeed a missed opportunity because as India’s
ern sector (Ladakh) and in the east (Arunachal Pradesh, Tfirst prime minister and towering leader of the freedom
formerly known as North-East Frontier Agency or NEFA) movement, Nehru had the power and mass popularity to
— came in 1960. China offered a workable solution, but disregard opposition parties and convince the public that
India rejected the offer and lost a historic opportunity. Then acceptance of Zhou’s compromise solution was in India’s
prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s weakness, vacillation long-term interest. Had he done so, India and China,
and lack of foresight were to blame, but also the sustained through give-and-take negotiations, could have peacefully
pressure of opposition parties on the prime minister to demarcated the border along its entire length and prevented
make “no compromises” relating to territory claimed by the border war of 1962 and subsequent recurring military
India. This resulted in the Indo-China border war of 1962. clashes along the LAC. Lastly, and not many people know
India’s defeat in that war has left such a deep psychological this, in 1960 China was willing, “as part of an overall settle-
scar that neither politicians nor people of India are pre- ment”, to accept India’s sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir
pared to view the boundary dispute objectively. (minus Aksai Chin) against Pakistan claims. In those days
But it’s important to state facts clearly and dispassion- Beijing accorded far greater importance to Sino-India ties.
ately. In 1960, at Nehru’s invitation, China’s premier Zhou Even today, a solution based on negotiation and com-
Enlai visited India. “I have come here to seek a solution promise is the best option to end the India-China border
and not to repeat arguments,” he said. At that time Zhou dispute permanently. Let’s ask ourselves: Can India defeat
offered a ‘package deal’ for final settlement of the boundary China militarily and wrest Aksai Chin? Similarly, can Chi-
issue. China would accept India’s sovereignty over NEFA, na annex Arunachal Pradesh by force? Indeed, in a 2005
which meant de jure recognition of the McMahon Line, if India-China agreement on “political parameters guiding
India accepted China’s lines drawn in Aksai Chin, Ladakh. settlement of the boundary dispute”, Beijing consented to
China has always challenged the McMahon Line as il- “safeguard due interests of settled populations in the border
legal, because it was arbitrarily drawn by British imperi- areas” — a clear reference to Arunachal Pradesh.
alists when neither China nor India was free. Neverthe- This being the case, can one-sided claims or a “no com-
less, Zhou, obviously with the approval of Chairman Mao promise” stance by either India or China guarantee peace
Zedong, agreed to accept the McMahon Line and thereby along the LAC, much less mutually beneficial cooperation,
India’s claim on NEFA. “Our friendship is the most impor- between our two civilizational nations that can, potential-
tant thing,” he told R.K. Nehru, former India ambassador to ly, shape a new and better world order? It is time to shun
China. “Non-settlement of this problem will harm us both.” jingoism and end this enmity in a win-win way.
Zhou spent 20 hours in talks with Nehru. But the latter (Sudheendra Kulkarni was an aide of former prime minister Atal Bihari
rejected the package deal because opposition leaders (in- Vajpayee (1999-2004) and is currently founder of Forum for South Asia)

30 EDUCATIONWORLD JANUARY 2023