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in district court. It filed a complaint on   petition and (2) between the filing of the   “appeals therein” meaningless because
         Feb. 5, 2019, seeking to collect Weiss’s   petition and its denial.  they refer to processes that do not exist,
         delinquent taxes plus accrued interest,   Interpretation of statutory   such as administrative appeals of CDP
         which then totaled $773,899.84.   language: The Third Circuit, citing   hearings within the IRS. This, the court
           In district court, Weiss claimed   Supreme Court and Third Circuit prec-  found, would nullify the phrase’s effect,
         that the IRS’s action was not timely,   edent, stated that words of statutes should   in contravention of the canon against
         claiming that the running of the limita-  be given their ordinary, common mean-  superfluity. On the other hand, the court
         tion period was not tolled under Sec.   ing. Furthermore, the words should be   determined that the fourth combination,
         6330(e)(1) from when the D.C. Circuit   given their contemporary meaning at the   “appeals” in the general sense and “there-
         issued its mandate through the time the   time the statute was adopted.  in” as “in such matter,” “produces a rea-
         Supreme Court denied his petition for a   Appeals therein: To interpret the   sonable outcome that is consistent with
         writ of certiorari. Sec. 6330(e)(1) states:   phrase “appeals therein,” the Third Cir-  multiple canons of construction.” Using
                                           cuit analyzed the dictionary meaning (in   those meanings for “appeals” and “there-
           if a hearing is requested … the   1998, when Sec. 6330(e)(1) was enacted)   in,” the court concluded that the phrase
           levy actions which are the subject   of each of the component words of the   applies to any appeals and petitions seek-
           of the requested hearing and the   phrase separately. It found both words   ing review of a CDP hearing, including a
           running of any period of limitations   had two possible meanings.  petition for a writ of certiorari.
           under section 6502 (relating to   Regarding “appeals,” the court found   Pending: The Third Circuit con-
           collection after assessment) … shall   that one common meaning, in a general   sidered two possible ordinary, common
           be suspended for the period during   sense, was to “[r]esort to a superior (i.e.   meanings for “pending.” The first mean-
           which such hearing, and appeals   appellate) court to review the decision   ing was “begun but not yet completed”
           therein, are pending. In no event   of an inferior (i.e. trial) court” (Black’s   (Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)).
           shall any such period expire before   Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)), and that,   With that meaning for “pending,” the
           the 90th day after the day on which   under this meaning, “appeal” could mean   hearing and the “appeals therein” would
           there is a final determination in   both appeals and petitions. A second,   be pending until the agency resolved
           such hearing.                   narrower meaning, the court found, was   the hearing or a court decided the ap-
                                           “a method of seeking review of an order   peal, but after resolution, neither the
           Weiss argued that (1) the phrase “ap-  that is distinct from other such methods,   hearing nor an “appeal therein” would
         peals therein” did not include petitions   such as a petition.” The court noted that   remain pending. In the context of
         for writs of certiorari; (2) a denial of a   under that narrower meaning, appeals   Sec. 6330(e)(1), tolling would occur
         petition for a writ of certiorari was not   tend to be provided as of right, while   while the hearing was active, but it would
         a “final determination” in a CDP hear-  petitions more frequently depend on the   cease for the interval between resolution
         ing for purposes of Sec. 6330(e)(1); and   discretion of the reviewing body.   of the initial hearing and the filing of an
         (3) the IRS’s collection action was not   Regarding “therein,” the court found   appeal, or for the period between when
         timely. The IRS argued the opposite.   that its ordinary, common meaning could   an appeal was resolved and the filing of
         The parties both moved for summary   be either “in that place” or “in that mat-  any allowable successive appeal.
         judgment on these issues.         ter.” Under the first meaning, in context,   Alternatively, the court found that in
           The district court held for the IRS.   the phrase “appeals therein” would refer   1998 the term “pending” had the ordi-
         Weiss appealed the district court’s deci-  to appeals pending in the same place as   nary, common meaning of “awaiting an
         sion to the Third Circuit.        the CDP hearing, which would be within   occurrence of conclusion of an action,”
                                           the IRS, not in a federal court. Under the   such that it described “a period of con-
         The Third Circuit’s decision      second, the phrase “appeals therein” in   tinuance or indeterminacy” (Black’s Law
         The Third Circuit affirmed the district   context would refer to appeals of a CDP   Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)). Under that
         court’s holding that the IRS’s collection   hearing determination.  meaning, a hearing or an appeal therein
         action was timely. It found, based on a   With the terms “appeals” and “therein”   would be pending after its resolution for
         plain-language meaning of the terms   each having two meanings, the Third   the period while the ruling remained
         “appeals therein” and “pending” in Sec.   Circuit observed that there are four pos-  indeterminate due to the possibility
         6330(e)(1), that the running of the limi-  sible combinations for the meaning of   of an impending or imminent appeal.
         tation period was tolled during the time   the phrase “appeals therein.” However, it   Thus, tolling under Sec. 6330(e)(1)
         (1) between the D.C. Circuit’s mandate   further observed that three of those com-  would be continuous from the starting
         and the filing of Weiss’s Supreme Court   binations would render the expression   date of the hearing through the date on



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