Page 21 - The Chief Culprit

xx y Introduction

the archives in Podolsk, a small town near Moscow. ere are piles and piles of boxes, most
packed right after the end of World War II and never opened.
I had to be extra careful not to show my real interest. I asked the archive workers to
assist me in my search to find maps of the deployment of the German troops. We found
those, but I was looking for something else too and I finally found it. One of the maps
showed the deployment of all the German troops just before the invasion. It also showed the
positions of all the Red Army divisions the way German military intelligence pictured them
just before the beginning of the war. at was exactly what I needed. I made a copy of it and
all the other maps.
e map of the German troop deployment gave me quite a shock. e position of the
divisions of the Red Army mirrored the position of the German Army. e border between
the Soviet Union and Germany went through the territory of Poland which Stalin and Hitler
had divided between them. e border was wavy. ere was a big foreland of Soviet territory
jutting into the German territory, like a Communist cape in the Nazi ocean. en there was
a big foreland of German territory that heavily indented the Soviet land. After that one could
see a Soviet landmass going deep into the German territory again, and a German cape in the
Soviet territory. e border took the form of two notched wheels. e red notches were cut-
ting into Hitler’s brown wheel, and the brown notches were cutting into Stalin’s red wheel.
e Soviet forces were concentrated in those two masses of land, two capes that were
indenting the German territory. e German divisions, tanks, artillery, and airfields were
situated right in front, on the left and on the right of the Soviet troops. Even in peace time,
Soviet divisions, corps, and armies were almost encircled by German troops. From a defensive
point of view such deployment of the Soviet troops was useless and stupid. e only thing
Hitler had to do was to attack the troops at the base of those promontories and the best
units of the Red Army would be trapped. e German divisions were also situated in the
promontories reaching far into the Soviet territory. ey also were almost encircled by Soviet
troops in peacetime. Stalin could close the mousetrap just as easily. From the defense point of
view this kind of deployment of the German troops was pure suicide. I can only say that the
Germans were not preparing for defense. ey were getting ready for a sudden strike. For a
sudden attack this position was very beneficial.
e Red Army was also preparing for a sudden attack. If you look at the position of
the Soviet divisions from the point of view of an offensive, you could not imagine a bet-
ter deployment. e airfields of the Red Army were moved all the way up to the border.
Communist propaganda masters laugh at that. ey say: “Look how stupid the Soviet gener-
als were, they situated the airfields in such a fashion that they fell to the enemy in the first
hours of the war.”
e German airfields were also situated almost on the border itself. Why is it that no-
body laughs at them? is way of positioning the troops and logistical forces does not make
sense from a defensive point of view. If you look at it from the point of view of offense it
makes total sense.
ere was no difference between the actions of Stalin and those of Hitler. Hitler just
happened to strike first. If Stalin had been the one to attack first, all the advantages of the
deployment of the German troops would have turned into disadvantages.
In order to understand what happened I will begin the story from 1917 when the
Communists took power in Russia, instead of 1941, when Hitler attacked Stalin.