Page 22 - The Chief Culprit
P. 22

Introduction  y  xxi


                        It is legitimate to wonder if German intelligence made a mistake. What if the Germans
                    were wrong in assessing the situation in the summer of 1941? I had to find an answer to that,
                    and I did. German intelligence saw the situation correctly, but it did not see all of it.  e
                    real picture was much graver.  e concentration of Soviet troops on the German border was
                    frightful. Anyone can see it for themselves. All you would have to do is open the memoirs of
                    the Soviet generals and put all the data about Soviet divisions, corps, and armies into a com-
                    puter. Every Soviet general describes his division or corps but also speaks about his neighbors,
                    about superior units, and about subordinates. It takes years to put it all together, but anyone
                    who does that will be convinced that all the data confirm what I said earlier, and the general
                    picture is terrifying.
                         e following simple fact can serve as additional proof of the aggressive ambition of
                    the Red Army. More than sixty years have passed since the Germans attacked the Soviet
                    Union, but neither the government of modern Russia nor the General Staff ever made pub-
                    lic any maps that would demonstrate the deployment of all Soviet divisions on June 21,
                    1941. All that information remains a state secret.  e highest level of secrecy in the Soviet
                    Union is a document labeled “Top Secret: Special Folder.” At present the Kremlin archives
                    contain 215,000 “Special Folders.” Nobody has access to them. In addition, there are hun-
                    dreds of thousands of documents labeled “Secret,” “Top Secret,” and “Top Secret: Of Special
                    Importance.”
                        Sometimes the Kremlin rulers try to show their liberalism and good will. A small num-
                    ber of those secrets come out in the open.  ey are always heinous secrets. For example, the
                    cooperation agreement between the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) and
                    the Gestapo became public knowledge. It was signed on November 11, 1938. Beria and
                    Muller signed that document. What areas of cooperation could there be between two of the
                    bloodiest organizations in the world’s history?  e answer is the following: in their main
                    specialty—suppressing freedom and engaging in the mass elimination of people.
                        Another document that surfaced recently speaks about secret contacts between Stalin
                    and Hitler. It is dated February 19, 1942. Stalin was an ally to Franklin D. Roosevelt and
                    Winston Churchill. He was trying to strike an agreement with Hitler behind their backs.
                    When papers like these become available to the public one should remember that they are
                    just a drop in a bucket.  ose documents are the ones the authorities are not ashamed to
                    show. All the documents that are not accessible to researchers contain secrets that are much
                    scarier and dirtier.
                        I am not a historian but I believe that there are a lot of similarities between history
                    and intelligence. Both a historian and an intelligence officer have to look for things that
                    nobody knows about.  e difference is that a historian would treat the Soviet Union as a
                    regular country, just like any other.  at is why he would use traditional methods of his-
                    torical science. I consider the Soviet Union a criminal conglomerate.  e Soviet leaders have
                    committed uncountable acts of atrocity against their own people and against neighboring
                    nations.  at is why for me the history of the Soviet Union should be studied using methods
                    of criminology and intelligence rather then classical scientific research.  Vladimir Bukovsky
                    was correct in noticing that Western politicians and diplomats just cannot understand the
                    motives of the Soviet leaders. If a policeman from Manhattan were to try to deal with them he
                    would have made sense of their behavior immediately. A policeman would have understood
                    and would have been able to predict all of the moves and actions of the Kremlin rulers. I
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