Page 23 - The Chief Culprit

xxii y Introduction

study the history of the Soviet Union using methods of intelligence. e first rule is: do not
believe what is officiously demonstrated to you; seek what is hidden. ey are demonstrating
the “unpreparedness” of the Soviet Union for the war, but hiding the offensive war plans.
ere are documents that point directly to the fact that the Soviet Union was readying
itself for an offensive against all of Europe in the summer of 1941. I figured out that one of
those documents was kept in the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense, in hold-
ing #16, register #2951, case #241, pages 1 through 16. It is a long story. I would have to write
a separate book about how I managed to figure out that this document exists. Juxtaposing
facts and evidence, I came to the conclusion that on March 11, 1941, Marshal Timoshenko
and Generals Zhukov and Vasilevsky, the heads of the USSR People’s Defense Commissariat,
forwarded to Stalin the plan of invading Germany. Both generals became marshals two years
after that.
While talking on BBC radio on August 17, 1996, I addressed the Russian leaders. I told
them: “If you have nothing to hide, publish the document!”
What was left for them to do? ey published the document. e book titled 1941
came out a year and a half later, in March 1998. It was a collection of documents. e collec-
tion was compiled by A. N. Yakovlev, a former member of the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, E. T. Gaidar, a former head of the
Russian Government, E. M. Primakov, a former head of the foreign intelligence service (who
later became the head of the Russian government), and many other respectable politicians.
e answer to my public demand to publish the document came almost immediately,
although the documents still had to be collected and the book prepared for print. e
document I speak about can be found on page 741 of the first volume. I started reading it
with excitement. But what was going on? Out of sixteen pages only five were published. e
document starts with the description of the German army, and with suppositions about the
intentions of the German command. at is all. Once the document goes into describing
the Red Army Forces and the plans of the Soviet Union, there is a heavy square bracket,
followed by an ellipsis, and another square bracket. After that one can see the signatures of
Marshal Timoshenko, and Generals Zhukov and Vasilevsky. e document stops at the most
interesting moment.
Two volumes are filled with garbage, documents that are completely insignificant. e
leaders of the former Soviet Union ran out of paper before they could publish the war plan.
Respectable Russian politicians act as petty crooks. e trick is very old: you take paper and
cut it neatly; then you put it in a wad of money to make it seem bigger. at is exactly how
they comprised the collection of documents they called 1941. It looks like a serious publica-
tion, it has good solid binding, the paper is high quality, and names of respectable authors are
on the cover. ere is a lot of unimportant flimflam in order to distract the reader’s attention,
but no substance, just emptiness.
I want to use this opportunity to repeat my demand: Rulers of Russia, publish docu-
ment CA MD RF, H. #16, R. #2951, C. #241, pp. 1–16. I will tell you more: open the war
archives! Sixty years have passed since the German invasion. It happened in the first half of the
last century. Why are the archives still closed? What are you hiding from the world?
Until you stop fooling the world with your grifter tricks, I will be forced to use methods
of military intelligence to study the history of the twentieth century.