Page 347 - The Chief Culprit

292 y Notes to Pages 28–41

3. Joseph Stalin, speech at the plenary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, August 1,
1927, published for the first time only twenty-five years later in Collected Works, 10: 49.
4. Stalin, Collected Works, 7: 72.
5. Stalin, Collected Works, 7: 14. is quote is taken from Stalin’s speech at the January 1925 plenary of the
Central Committee, which discussed, among other things, an increase in military expenditures.
6. Quoted in Joachim Fest, Hitler: A Biography (Perm, Russia: Alteya, 1993), 2: 234.
7. Henry Piker, Hitler’s Table Talks (Smolensk, Russia: Rusich, 1998), entry from May 6, 1942.
8. Stalin, Collected Works, 11: 202.

Chapter 8
Epigraph: Alexander Lapchinsky, e Air Army (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1939), 144.
1. P. Stefanovsky, ree Hundred Unknowns (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968), 83.
2. Shumikhin, Soviet Military Aviation, 218.
3. V. B. Shavrov, e History of Aircraft Design in the USSR, 1939–1950 (Moscow: Mashinostroyenie,
1988), 162.
4. L. Kerber, TU: Man and Airplane (Moscow: Sovetskaya Rossia, 1973), 143.
5. L. Kerber, TU: Man and Airplane, article in Trail in the Sky (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), 202
6. G. J. Taylor, Combat Aircraft of the World (London: Ebury Press, 1969), 592.
7. Vaclav Nemecek, e History of Soviet Aircraft from 1918 (London: Willow Books, 1986), 134.
8. M. Gallay, ird Dimension (Moscow: Sovetski Pisatel, 1973), 330.
9. M. Maslov, “Dreadnought” in M-Hobby magazine (Moscow), nos. 5–6 (1997): 9, 11. e order to
launch serial production of the TB-7 provided for the plans to produce eight lots of TB-7s, for a total of
fifty-one aircraft. However, the order was never signed. Kazan Aircraft Factory #142, which was selected
to produce the TB-7, had modern equipment, purchased in the United States and delivered to the fac-
tory. Actually, the factory had the capacity to produce up to one hundred TB-7s annually. If necessary,
other factories could also have been switched to TB-7 production.
10. e TB-7 was completely unreachable until 1940, when the Luftwaffe started to receive mass deliveries
of the Bf109 E-3.
11. e operational capabilities of the TB-7 bomber were described in an impartial, comprehensive, and
detailed manner by Vladimir Ratkin, “PE-8 Testing by War,” in the magazine Mir Aviatsii [ e World
of Aviation], nos. 1 and 2 (1996) and no. 1 (1997), as well as by N. Yakubovich, “ e PE-8’s Unenviable
Fate,” in the magazine Krylia Rodiny [Wings of the Motherland], no. 11 (1995) and no. 1 (1996); also
in USSR Aircraft Industry, 1917–1945 (Moscow: TSAGI Publications Department, 1994), 2: 68–69.
12. G. Ozerov, Tupolev’s Sharaga (Frankfurt: Possev, 1971), 47.
13. Vladimir Ratkin, Mir Aviatsii, no. 1 (1996), 15. Only four aircraft had the fifth additional engine.
14. Tupolev’s Aircraft ANT-1 —ANT-15 (Moscow: Tupolev ANTK, 1995), 16.
15. E. Riabchikov and A. Magid, e Becoming (Moscow: Znanie, 1978), 132.
16. Giulio Douhet, Italian general (1869–1930). In 1910 he theorized that heavy bomber aviation would
play a decisive role in the next war.
17. Shumikhin, Soviet Military Aviation, 185.
18. A.Yakovlev, Life’s Task (Moscow: Politizdat, 1973), 168.
19. Ibid., 182.
Chapter 9
Epigraph: Robert Goralski, World War II Almanac, 1931–1945 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1981),
164.
1. Domestic Armored Vehicles, 1905–1941 (Moscow: Exprint, 2002), 235.
2. Domestic Armored Vehicles, Twentieth Century, 121, 127. In April 1938, a prototype of the infantry tank
Mark II (A12) Matilda II was built in Britain. In armor thickness, this tank exceeded all other tanks
around the world. Its frontal armor was 78 mm, its turret front armor was 75 mm, its side armor was
75 mm, and its aft armor was 55 mm; the T-28 had 30, 20, 20, and 20 mm armor; the T-28E had 50,
80, 40, and 40 mm armor. But the Matilda’s weaponry was exceedingly weak: a 40-mm gun and one or
two machine guns. ere were two engines, 95 horsepower each. Because of the underpowered engines,