Page 36 - The Chief Culprit

e First Contact y 13

Trillisser, Yagoda, and many others. e Soviet ambassador to Germany, Nikolai Krestinski,
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formed a powerful web of secret intelligence. e Soviet embassy transformed itself into the
headquarters of the revolution. rough it orders were passed from Moscow, along with a
flow of funds, which were immediately transformed into a storm of subversive propaganda,
arms, and war supplies.
e Comintern commission dealing with German affairs consisted of the entire Soviet
leadership: Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Radek. Stalin thought that it was nec-
essary to avoid at all cost anything that might reveal that the revolution was “dictated”
or “instigated” by the USSR. e plan was simple: November 7—the anniversary of the
Communist takeover in Russia—would be the day for workers’ demonstrations of solidar-
ity in Germany. Special units, trained in Moscow by Communist secret police and military
intelligence under the supervision of Joseph Unshlikht, would act as provocateurs and incite
conflicts with police. eir goal was to cause violent clashes and arrests thus inflaming the
anger of the workers. On November 8, the clashes were to grow from street fights into more
serious threats. On the night of November 9, Unshlikht’s units were to seize the most im-
portant government establishments, making it appear to be a spontaneous reaction of the
masses against police brutality.
e script was simple, yet reliable. e so-called “Great October Socialist Revolution”
followed the same script; so did the “proletarian revolutions” in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia
in 1918 and in 1940. Following this blueprint, Communists took control of many states af-
ter World War II: a “spontaneous demonstration” of workers, the wrath of the people—and
small units of cunning professionals.
e difference was that in the German revolution of 1923 the Communists had reli-
able allies: the Nazis. At this point in time, the German Workers’ Party already had a new
name—it was the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP was the German
acronym)—and it had a new Fuehrer: Adolf Hitler. “A slogan of the Comintern was: ‘War
on Stresemann [the chancellor and foreign minister of Germany] and Poincaré [the prime
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minister of France]!’ A slogan of the Nazis was: ‘War on Poincaré and Stresemann!’ ere
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had even been talks between Radek and certain leaders of the Nazi party.” 15
Karl Radek was a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and a member
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. He had been to Germany
several times with the goal of triggering a revolution. In 1919 he was arrested by German
authorities, but was quickly sent home. In 1923 he once again returned to Germany. Could
any of the Nazi party leaders conduct talks with the member of the Executive Committee
of the Comintern, Comrade Radek, without having Hitler’s express consent for doing so?
And could Karl Radek conduct talks with Nazi leaders without a direct order from Stalin? It
is remotely possible that Radek acted on his own but, knowing Stalin’s obsession with con-
trol, it is highly unlikely. Stalin told the Central Committee that “[a] German committee of
the Comintern, consisting of Zinoviev, Bukharin, Stalin, Trotsky, Radek, and a number of
German comrades, adopted a number of specific decisions dealing with the direct assistance
to the German comrades in [the] task of seizing power.” Radek expressed an open enthusi-
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asm for Hitler’s storm troopers and said: “We can see on the faces of German students wear-
ing brown shirts the same devotion and the same inspiration which shone on [the] faces of
Red Army officers.” Radek praised the storm troopers as “great guys,” adding: “You will see
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that they will fight for us, lobbing hand grenades.” 18