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                  622                   CHAPTER 15   RISK AND INFORMATION

                  APPLICA TION  15.3
                  If AIG Can Collapse, Why Would
                                                                   serve as intermediaries in this process. For example,
                  Anyone Supply Insurance?                         State Farm will use the cash that you paid last month for
                                                                   your automobile insurance policy to compensate some
                  We have just seen that a risk-averse consumer has an  other car owner who had the misfortune to experience
                  incentive to demand insurance. But why would anyone  an automobile accident this month.
                  have an incentive to  supply insurance? You might    Viewed in this way, insurance is fundamentally
                  guess that if risk-averse preferences explain insurance  about sharing risk among a group of individuals so
                  demand, then risk-loving preferences explain insur-  that no one in the group bears an undue amount of
                  ance supply. After all, aren’t insurance suppliers really  risk. Because of this, insurance markets can arise even
                  taking a gamble that the insured party will not expe-  when all parties are risk averse, as long as the risk the
                  rience a loss? The dramatic collapse of the insurance  parties bear are, to some degree, independent of each
                  firm AIG in 2008 illustrates the consequences that   other. That is, when one individual (or a group of indi-
                  can arise when that gamble does not pay off. But the  viduals) suffers a loss, there must be other individuals
                  answer to why insurance gets supplied is more subtle  who do not suffer a loss. This is usually true of almost
                  than this and does not require that insurance suppliers  all risks for which some form of insurance exists. A no-
                  be risk lovers. A brief look at the history of insurance  table example of when independence does not hold
                  will help clarify this point.                    involved the housing mortgage industry in 2008–2009.
                      In his engaging history of the concept of risk,  To understand this example, it is first necessary to de-
                  Against the Gods, Peter Bernstein points out that the   scribe mortgage securitization and credit default swaps.
                                                            7
                  insurance business had its roots in the ancient world. In  When a bank loans money to purchase a home,
                  ancient Greece and Rome, for example, an early version  the home owner is promising to make monthly pay-
                  of life insurance was provided by occupational guilds.  ments for the life of the mortgage (usually 30 years).
                  These groups asked their members to contribute to   However, there is a risk that the home owner will stop
                  a pool that would then be used to provide financial sup-  making those payments, for example, if the owner loses
                  port to a family if the head of the family unexpectedly  a job and can no longer afford the mortgage. In typical
                  died. In medieval Italy, an early version of crop insurance  economic times, the risk that a home owner will default
                  arose when farmers created cooperative organizations  on a mortgage in this way is independent of the risk of
                  that would insure one another against losses due to  default on mortgages issued to other home owners. If
                  bad weather. Under this arrangement, farmers in one  one mortgage defaults, home owners with other mort-
                  part of the country that experienced good weather  gages typically  keep making their payments to the
                  would compensate farmers in another part of the coun-  bank. In effect, the bank charges a small profit margin
                  try whose crops had been impaired by bad weather.  to all mortgage holders, as a form of insurance for
                  And the most famous insurance company of all, Lloyds  when one mortgage goes into default. In fact, the
                  of London, started in 1771 when a group of individuals  mortgage industry spreads the risks of mortgage even
                  (the Society of Lloyds) who did business at Lloyds cof-  more broadly through mortgage securitization. Banks
                  feehouse agreed to commit their personal wealth to  sell their mortgages to companies such as Fannie
                  underwrite any losses incurred by group members and  Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association), a fed-
                  their customers. The group that paid insurance premi-  erally sponsored corporation. Fannie Mae then issues
                  ums to the society included shipowners, merchants, and  mortgage-backed securities, similar to bonds, the
                  building owners.                                 value of which depends on the monthly payments on
                      These historical examples illustrate the basic principle  thousands of mortgages. Investors and mutual funds
                  of insurance: A group of people who have not sustained  can buy these securities as part of their portfolios. Thus,
                  losses provides money to compensate other people who  the risks from thousands of individual mortgages (hope-
                  have sustained losses. In modern economies, insurance  fully independent of each other) are combined, and
                  companies such as Prudential and State Farm in effect  that joint risk is then spread over many investors. In the

                                        7 See especially Chapter 5 of P. L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (New York:
                                        John Wiley & Sons), 1996.
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