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the plan before confirmation, and in the meantime had filed another suit seeking “consequential damages”
        for violation of the arbitration agreement.  When he refused to dismiss that suit after receiving notice of the
        confirmed plan, the family sought injunctive relief and sanctions before the bankruptcy court.
            The family invoked 11 U.S.C. § 105, which provides that a bankruptcy court “may issue any
        order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the
        Bankruptcy Code.  It maintained that Miller's new suit was "related to" the specifically-released actions
        and thus barred by the release in the plan.

            The  bankruptcy  court  agreed  and  enjoined  Miller.    He  appealed,  but  the  district  court  eventually
        affirmed.  That prompted the appeal to the Seventh Circuit, focusing on the
        contention  Miller  could  not  be  bound  by  the  plan  because  he  was  not  a
        creditor or other formal party in the bankruptcy.  Relying on In re Airadigm
        Comm., Inc., 519 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008), the Court of Appeals found
        that § 105 provided the bankruptcy court with "residual authority" to
        enter  orders  affecting  third  parties.  Moreover,  it  said,  this  “'residual
        authority”'  was  consistent  with  a  bankruptcy  court's  “'traditionally  broad'
        equitable powers".  Under those principles, it said, the bankruptcy court had
        authority to release the claims against the family members.  That being decided, the court sustained the
        injunction without serious analysis of whether the injunction, as opposed to the release, was proper.
                               Several  points  should  be  noted.    First,  Ingersoll  ignores  the  principles  that
                           “whatever  equitable  powers  remain  in  the  bankruptcy  courts  must  and  can  only  be
                           exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code” and when there is an applicable
                           Code  provision  it  controls  (Norwest  Bank  v.  Ahlers,  485  U.S.  197,  206  (1988)).  11
                           U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6) permits a bankruptcy court to include in a plan “any other provision
                           not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of” the Code.  If the issue was propriety
                           of the plan provision, that and other provisions governing what is proper in a plan – not
                           § 105 or general equitable principles – would seem to have been controlling.
                               Second, the court emphasized it was “not saying” that a plan “purporting to
                           release a claim like Miller's is always – or even normally – valid.”  Such a release
        cannot amount to "'blanket immunity' for all times, all transgressions, and all omissions", it said.  Rather,
        such a release provision must be "narrowly tailored and critical to the plan as a whole."  The court found
        those tests met in “the unique circumstances of this case”, although there was a dearth of analysis as to
        why  the  releases  of  the  non-debtor  individuals  were  “critical”  to  the  plan  for  the  corporate  debtors
        (particularly since the plan had become one for liquidation).

            Third,  while  Ingersoll teaches that  the facts that  the family members were  nondebtors and  that
        Miller was not a creditor of the bankruptcy estate were not dispositive; it relies heavily on the fact
        that Miller received notice and an opportunity to object to the plan.
            Finally, the court found a "broader lesson" in the case:  "Good advocacy does not exist in a vacuum, it
        must be balanced with a willingness to compromise, to behave reasonably, and sometimes, to leave well
        enough alone . . . .  What started as a simple fee dispute ended as a multi-year, multi-court monster that,
        as far as we can tell, benefited no one."   A fair inference is that the court’s belief that the long-running
        litigation should be put to an end was the real “equitable” consideration supporting the result.

                                                                                   John\Sharp Thinking\#22.doc         Brenda\Sharp Thinking\#22.doc
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