Page 64 - Arabian Studies (V)

54 Arabian Studies V
over the Hijaz, the British Government rapidly adjusted to the
altered situation by tempering its pro-Husayn policy in a number of
important respects. Firstly, it abandoned its former position of
adjudicating the contested territory at Khurmah to Husayn without
the benefit of a boundary commission or a detailed examination of
the merits of the dispute. Secondly, Britain agreed to Ibn Sard’s
long standing request that it arbitrate his differences with Husayn.
And, thirdly, Britain abandoned its earlier tactics of threatening
Ibn Sa‘ud in favour of a policy of negotiation and conciliation.
These changes were due to the fact that Ibn Sa‘ud’s increased
stature in the Arabian Peninsula as a result of his success made it
incumbent upon the British Government to come to terms with him
in order to protect the Hijaz and its Holy Cities and to prevent the
growth of French influence in Arabia. Britain also needed Ibn
Sa‘ud’s friendship in order to stabilize its newly established posi­
tion in Mesopotamia and to insure the safety of the string of British
protected principalities along the shore of the Gulf. Although since
1915 Britain had given priority to its relationship with Husayn, the
influence of the Indian officials and of Lord Curzon had insured
that the British Government had not alienated Ibn Sa‘ud irre­
vocably. Consequently, despite the tension which developed in
Anglo-Najd relations in 1918-19 as a result of British support for
the Sharif in the Khurmah crisis, after the battle of Turabah Britain
was in a favourable position to seek a modus vivendi with Ibn
Sa‘ud and to rely increasingly on the Najdl ruler rather than on
Husayn as their best friend in the Arabian Peninsula.
Philby never reached Ibn Sa‘ud’s camp to deliver the British
proposal, becaue Husayn would not allow him to pass through
Hijaz territory. The Sharif also refused to consider any plan requir­
ing arbitration of his dispute with Ibn Sa‘ud. Possibly Husayn’s
attitude was influenced by the rapid passing of the military threat
to his kingdom. On 23 June 1919 Allenby reported the receipt of a
letter from Ibn Sa‘ud stating that he and his army were with­
drawing into the interior of Najd and would not move in the direc­
tion of the Hijaz, as long as Husayn remained quiescent and did
not challenge continued Wahhabi rule both at Khurmah and
Turabah.71 By crushing Husayn’s army and successfully defending
his position at Khurmah, Ibn Sa‘ud had achieved his immediate
objective. He was not inclined to jeopardize further his relations
with the British Government by continuing his offensive into the
Hijaz, although he undoubtedly had the capability. Ibn Sa‘ud
' recognized that he could not oppose Britain for an extended period
! on an important issue, and it was these elements of good judgment
and limited objectives that largely accounted for his success.
! •