Page 59 - Arabian Studies (V)

The British Government and the Khurmah Dispute 49
Husayn views of the Egyptian officials was maintained at the
conference by Shuckburgh. He pointed out that ‘our main object
was to prevent the Holy Places from being overrun by the Wahabis*
and that Wingate’s policy ‘would be more likely to precipitate an
attack on the Holy Places than to prevent it.’ Shuckburgh also was
sceptical about the allegedly dangerous and hostile nature of the
Ikhwan movement. He believed that ‘If the movement became aggres­
sive later on we might have to declare against it; but, so far, the evidence
of aggressive intention did not amount to much.’ Finally, Shuckburgh
noted that ‘in view of the relations we had had with Ibn Saud, and of
our attempts to establish a friendship with him, it was a little
awkward for us to turn round now and say “you are a heretic’”.
Philby, again speaking in defence of Ibn Sa‘ud, stated that the
Najdl ruler would resent a termination of his subsidy, especially if
it were combined with a demand that he should give up Khurmah.
According to Philby, ‘Ibn Saud regarded the subsidy as a perma­
nency, a quid pro quo for our monopoly of political influence in
Central Arabia’. Furthermore, Ibn Sa‘ud could not withdraw easily
from the disputed territory, because, ‘On his continued possession
of Khurma depended his whole position as head of the Wahabi
movement in Central Arabia’. Philby concluded by reiterating his
plea for a British boundary commission to delimit the disputed
border and predicted accurately that if Ibn Sa‘ud were ordered to
leave Khurmah, ‘he would certainly disobey’.
Curzon finally resolved the debate in favour of the pro-Husayn
faction because, as he noted, ‘it was difficult to resist such a combi­
nation of authority as Cheetham, Clayton, [A.T.] Wilson, and
Wingate’. But Curzon believed that a complete termination of Ibn
Sa‘ud’s subsidy, as suggested by Wilson and Wingate, would be too
abrupt and might lead to an immediate Wahhabi attack on the
Hijaz. Consequently, he proposed to reduce the subsidy by half
and inform the Najdl ruler that the British Government viewed
Khurmah as Hijaz territory. Curzon further stated that ‘our
attitude towards Saud, and the possible stoppage of his entire
subsidy, would depend upon his conduct in this matter’. Thus the
March 1919 session of the Interdepartmental Conference reversed
the policy decided upon at the meetings in January and February.
Previously it had been agreed that the ultimate disposition of the
contested territory at Khurmah was a matter of dispute and that the
British Government could make no decision on the merits of the
issue without the benefit of a boundary commission. Now it was
decided that broader considerations necessitated the immediate
adjudication of Khurmah to Husayn, coupled with severe pressure
on Ibn Sa‘ud to insure his ready compliance.