Page 56 - Arabian Studies (V)

46 Arabian Studies V
the danger of an Ikhwan occupation of Mecca. Consequently, he
maintained that if ‘they did come to blows, and the Wahabis were
victorious and the Hejaz or the Holy Places were threatened ... we
should be bound to support King Hussein with munitions, though
in no circumstances with troops*. But Curzon believed that British
assistance might not be necessary because the recent surrender of
the Turkish garrison at Medina had freed a considerable number of
Hijaz troops which had been investing the city, thereby strenthen-
ing Husayn’s hand. In accordance with Curzon’s recommendation,
the conference decided that ‘for the moment no action was consi­
dered necessary by His Majesty’s Government*.
On 24 February 1919 the Interdepartmental Conference again
considered the Najd-Hijaz dispute.50 Both Philby and Wingate
were present at this session to present the respective views of the
Mesopotamian and Egyptian authorities. Philby argued for the
appointment of a British commission to demarcate the disputed
border in accordance with the Anglo-Najd treaty and thereby settle
the Khurmah question in a peaceful and equitable manner. Ibn Sa‘ud
already had agreed to this solution, and Philby was confident that
he would accept the decision of the commission. Philby stressed the
importance of maintaining good relations with Ibn Sa‘ud in the
postwar period, because if the Najdl ruler were convinced of
British indifference or hostility he might gravitate towards France
or Italy. Finally, Philby noted that if Britain allowed the parties to
Fight there might be an Ikhwan raid on Mecca. This eventually
would be damaging to British prestige in the Muslim world, espe­
cially if the city were looted.
Wingate, on the other hand, maintained that Khurmah was
I Hijaz territory and supported Husayn’s refusal to consider a
; boundary commission to decide the matter. While the High
Commissioner formerly had objected to permitting the two sides to
resort to military measures to settle the dispute, he now felt that the
Sharif had been strengthened sufficiently by the fall of Medina that
the British Government could view this prospect with equanimity.
i Wingate had little knowledge of Arabian conditions and consis­
tently had overestimated Husayn’s military strength and political
acumen. In November 1915 he had predicted erroneously that the
Sharif ‘will be able, if given time, to reconcile the divergent local
policies of the various Arabian chieftains and to secure co­
i operation in driving the Turk from the Arab countries. I am
inclined to believe that the divergence of these local policies is less
great than would appear’.51 Now Wingate stated flatly that ‘We
might have every confidence that if he [Husayn] did attack, he
i would make short work of Ibn Saud ... our proper, policy seemed