Page 51 - Arabian Studies (V)

The British Government and the Khunnah Dispute 41
London, frequently stressed this point. They also noted that the
Sharif was not powerful enough to compel Ibn Sa‘ud to recognize
his suzerainty. For example, in March 1918 Sir Percy Cox, Civil
Commissioner in Mesopotamia and Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, stated that ‘Ibn Saud would never acknowledge the
King as his temporal overlord.’ Moreover, ‘Cox discounted the
possibility of King Hussein ever being in a position to crush Ibn
Saud.’21 The following June Cox again pressed his view that ‘it is
out of the question to think of getting Ibn Saud to accept the recog­
nition of the Sherif as King of Arabia.’22 In November 1918 Philby,
who had just returned to Baghdad after a year as British represen­
tative to Ibn Sa‘ud, argued that the Najdi ruler was ‘an unsur-
mountable obstacle’ in the path of Husayn’s political ambitions
and that, consequently, the suzerainty policy was ‘entirely Utopian’
and ‘incapable of achievement’.23 In the same month Sir Arthur
Hirtzel, Assistant Undersecretary of State for India, wrote ‘it is
certain that no one in the Arabian peninsula (except possibly Bin
Rashid) and a few in Iraq will vote for King Husain’s suzerainty.’24
Contrary to the Cairo view, the Indian officials were scornful of
the entire conception of Arab unity and apprehensive of the effects,
both in Mesopotamia and in the Gulf, of British encouragement of
the Sharif’s pretensions to the leadership of the Arab world. From
the beginning of British negotiations with Husayn in 1915, the
Indian officials had disbelieved in the efficacy of an Arab revolt
against the Turks and had feared that the extension of military
operations to the Holy Land of Islam would have adverse repercus­
sions on Muslim opinion in India. They also had disliked the policy
of encouraging a nationalist movement in an area so close to India
where the example probably would not go unnoticed. However, the
Indian officials usually viewed Ibn Sa‘ud favourably because,
unlike Husayn, he was concerned primarily with preserving and
consolidating his position in Arabia rather than with asserting
grandiose claims to the politial leadership of large sections of the
Ottoman Empire. Although Ibn Sa‘ud sought independence for
himself, he was relatively indifferent to the larger question of Arab
nationalism.25 Moreover, Ibn Sa‘ud displayed a willingness to be
integrated into the framework of British protected principalities
along the short of the Gulf and to allow Britain to control his
foreign relations.26 He also was amenable to continued British rule
in Mesopotamia after the war, which was a key Indian objective.
Consequently, during the Khurmah crisis the Indian officials
attempted to utilize Ibn Sa‘ud as a check upon the Sharif’s expan­
sionist and Arab nationalist ambitions.
After the initial clash between Husayn and Ibn Sa‘ud in June