Page 53 - Arabian Studies (V)

The British Government and the Khurmah Dispute 43
of his territories have been discussed and laid down as provided for
in the [Anglo-Najd] Treaty’. The British Government said that it
would be difficult to settle definitively complicated boundary
questions while the war lasted, but that after the conclusion of
hostilities it would give its good offices to both parties for the
purpose of an amicable adjustment of their differences. Mean­
while, the Sharif should be allowed to occupy the disputed terri­
tory. Philby was instructed further to inform Ibn Sa'ud that
Husayn’s movement against Khurmah was a purely local action
designed solely to suppress a rebellious subject and was in no way
directed against Ibn Sa‘ud’s territory east of Khurmah.32 The
judgment to favour the Sharif in the dispute over Khurmah was a
logical continuation of the British Government’s established pro-
Husayn policy. However, while Britain informed Ibn Sa‘ud that
the Sharif should be allowed to occupy Khurmah pending a final
settlement of the quarrel after the war, the message did not threaten
the Najdi ruler with dire consequences if he refused to abandon the
disputed territory. After the war the British Government would
resort to stronger measures embodying serious threats in order to
oust Ibn Sa‘ud’s forces from Khurmah. But with the conflict against
Turkey still in progress, Britain did not want to alienate Ibn Sa‘ud to
the point that he might strike out rashly against the Hijaz, perhaps in
the process linking up with the Ottoman garrison at Medina.33
Ibn Sa‘ud strongly objected to the British Government’s decision
to allow Husayn to occupy Khurmah. He informed Philby that
public opinion in Najd would prevent him from accepting such a
decision, even if personally he were amenable.34 In September 1918,
while the Najdi ruler was engaged in the north against Ibn Rashid,
Husayn dispatched another expedition to capture Khurmah. This
force, like its two predecessors, was defeated by Khalid. It was
evident now to the British Government that despite its instructions
Ibn Sa‘ud had not ordered his followers to withdraw from the
disputed territory. In November 1918 the Cairo authorities learned
that Ibn Sa‘ud had dispatched 450 men as reinforcements to
Khurmah, demonstrating clearly that he did not intend to abandon
the position. There were also reports indicating that for the first
time Ikhwan units were operating west of Khurmah, thereby posing
a more direct threat to the Hijaz.35
In light of this deteriorating situation at the end of 1918,
the Egyptian officials suggested that additional pressure should
be placed on Ibn Sa‘ud to conform with the wishes of the
British Government. Colonel Wilson at Jedda proposed that ‘a
peremptory message be sent immediately to Saud from H.M.G.
ordering him to withdraw all Akhwan from Khurma district and,