Page 58 - Arabian Studies (V)

48 Arabian Studies V
‘the time has come when we must take a definite side in this
dispute. I consider we must back King Hussein against Wahabi
encroachment and show Bin [Sa‘ud] clearly we are doing so.’53
Colonel C.E. Wilson especially feared the adverse effect on Husayn
when he learned officially thaothe British Government regarded
Khurmah as disputable territory.54 Sir Milne Cheetham, acting
High Commissioner in Egypt in Wingate’s absence, wanted to
delay informing the Sharif of the decision of the conference.55
These views, coming from established partisans of Husayn, were
not unexpected. What was surprising was that Colonel Arnold
Wilson, officiating Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia, who had
been well disposed towards Ibn Sa‘ud, now supported Husayn. On
2 March 1919 he proposed an immediate end to Ibn Sa‘ud’s
subsidy, coupled with a warning to him that the Sharif should be
allowed to occupy Khurmah.56 Arnold Wilson’s abrupt change on
this question is difficult to explain, particularly since he soon rever­
ted to his former position. Perhaps it is accountable partially by the
fact that he was in Cairo at the time and therefore under the
influence of members of the Arab Bureau. Wilson also appears to
have been irritated that he was not consulted about the policy
adopted by the Interdepartmental Conference. Wilson’s views were
criticized within the India Office for being excessively favourable to
Husayn and likely to estrange Ibn Sa‘ud from the British cause.57
However, the combined influence of the leading Egyptian and
Mesopotamian authorities was sufficient to induce Curzon to
reopen the entire question at a meeting of the Interdepartmental
i Conference on 10 March 1919.58
Repeating his role at the February session of the conference,
Wingate maintained an uncompromisingly pro-Husayn position.
He believed that Ibn Sa‘ud’s subsidy should be discontinued imme­
diately and the disputed territory adjudicated to the Sharif without
the benefit of a boundary commission. The High Commissioner’s
rejection of a boundary commission was logical, because his
primary concern did not focus on the details of the territorial
dispute between Ibn Sa‘ud and Husayn. He was convinced that
Wahhabism ‘is a fanatical, reactionary, and therefore Anti-
European Creed’ and that ‘its expansion in its most militant form
by means of the “Ikhwan” is contrary to our interest and should be
discouraged ... He had seen many similar cases in the Sudan.
Mahdism had risen to power because of our own weakness in not
dealing strongly with it in its earliest stages.’ Wingate concluded
that ‘we could not afford to dilly-dally with this movement’ and
that ‘it must be crushed.*
The traditional India Office opposition to the extreme pro-