Page 62 - Arabian Studies (V)

52 Arabian Studies V
King is dependent for his army upon mercenaries of the worst type,
Ibn Saud has at his command large forces prompted by religious
fanaticism of a most desperate and self-sacrificing character’.62
Ibn Sa‘ud now held a defenceless Hijaz at his mercy. Colonel
C.E. Wilson at Jcdda, fearing that the Najdi army soon would
overrun the entire Hijaz, was especially alarmed at the prospect of
having to evacuate some 11,500 British Indians currently resident at
Mecca and Jedda. Consequently, he urged General Allenby to send a
number of British warplanes with their crews to the Hijaz to
dissuade Ibn Sa‘ud from pressing his victory and to oppose him
forcibly if he continued his advance.63 The Government of India,
however, resisted this suggestion. The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford,
maintained that ‘their [the aeroplanes’] presence in vicinity of Holy
Places could only be regarded as insult to Islam. Pilot moreover
unacquainted with delicate situation might unintentionally commit
unpardonable outrage on feelings of people.’64 The Government of
India’s protest was not sustained by the India Office, and Allenby
dispatched six warplanes with their pilots to the Hijaz to stand by in
case of need. But Allenby’s intention to send a company of Indian
Muslim troops as an escort was vetoed on the representation of
Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India.65 It was in this
atmosphere that the Interdepartmental Conference met on 13 June
1919 to consider a completely altered situation.66 In Curzon’s
words, ‘The Conference had to decide whether His Majesty’s
Government should take the unprecedented step of defending
Jeddah* with British Muslim troops should it come under attack by
Ibn Sa‘ud’s forces.
A consensus quickly developed against sending British troops to
Hijaz. Montagu explained that his reason for deprecating the
employment of Indian Muslim soldiers was ‘the fear of unpleasant
incidents, or even mutiny, amongst the Mahommedans of the
Indian Army when they heard that Indian troops were being sent to
support a Mahommedan chief who had rebelled against the
Caliph’. Shuckburgh supported Montagu and observed that ‘to the
Moslem agitator any stick was good enough to beat the Govern­
ment with. However illogical their attitude might be the effect of
their appeals would have to be reckoned with.* Major-General
Radcliffe, Director of Military Operations at the War Office,
pointed out that pressing commitments elsewhere made it difficult
for the army to provide troops for the Hijaz. Curzon believed that
‘Ibn Saud had lost control of his own men and that no further steps
on our part ... were likely to have any effect in restraining the
Wahabis’. Still, as a contingency measure, the Conference decided
to ask the Government of India about the probable attitude of
;