Page 63 - Arabian Studies (V)

The British Government and the Khurmah Dispute 53
Indian Muslims in the event of an appeal being made to them by
Husayn to cooperate in the defense of the Holy Places against the
Wahhabis.
In Delhi Lord Chelmsford opposed the employment of Indian
Muslim troops in the Hijaz to defend Husayn. He explained that
their participation ‘would give Moslem India claim hard to resist to
participate in settlement of Hedjaz problem* and that it almost
certainly would advocate the ‘restitution of Holy Places to suzer­
ainty ... of Sultan of Turkey’.67 It soon appeared, however, that
Indian troops would not be necessary to save Husayn. On 14 June
Allenby reported the receipt of a conciliatory message from Ibn
Sa‘ud stating that he had no aggressive intentions towards the
Hijaz and repeating his readiness to submit the entire dispute to
British arbitration. Furthermore, Ibn Sa‘ud said that he would
withdraw his army into the interior of Najd if the British Govern­
ment assured him that Husayn’s forces would not advance into the
disputed territory pending arbitration.68 Allenby proposed to capi­
talise on this development. He now suggested that a negotiated
solution should be sought at a meeting on the presence of British
between Ibn Sa‘ud and ‘Abdullah in the presence of British officers
associated with the views of each side.69 Three days later, on 17
June 1919, the Interdepartmental Conference met to consider
Allenby’s proposal.70
Philby immediately spoke against Allenby’s position. He feared
that a meeting at which both leaders probably would be accompa­
nied by a large armed force would result only in further bloodshed.
Instead, Philby suggested that he himself visit Ibn Sa‘ud in an
effort to induce him to withdraw from Turabah, but not from
Khurmah, pending the arbitration of a British boundary commis­
sion. Montagu, however, pointed out that ‘the proposal that Ibn
Saud should only be made to withdraw from Tarabah, and that he
should be left in occupation of Khurma, amounted in effect to
acknowledging a claim which His Majesty’s Government had
hitherto not accepted—that the possession of Khurma was a debat­
able point’. Curzon was aware of this problem, but he saw little
alternative. He explained that Ibn Sa‘ud was now in a strong posi­
tion and that if he ‘were to consider himself provoked in any way
he would continue his operations and attack and seize the Holy
Places’. The conference thereupon adopted Philby’s proposal in
preference to that of Allenby. Philby was instructed to inform Ibn
Sa‘ud that if he halted his advance into the Hijaz and withdrew his
forces from Turabah, the British Government would arbitrate his
dispute with Husayn.
Thus in June 1919, after Ibn Sa‘ud’s decisive military victory