Page 57 - Arabian Studies (V)

The British Government and the Khunnah Dispute 47
to be to allow him to crush this Wahabism’. The High Commis­
sioner, however, was willing to consider a peaceful settlement of
the crisis, as long as the result was in Husayn’s favour. Accord­
ingly, he suggested a solution, recently proposed by Hogarth,
which would suspend Ibn Sa'ud's monthly subsidy immediately
until the Sharif had reestablished his authority in Khurmah and all
Iklnvan movement in the direction of the Hijaz had ceased. If Ibn
Sa‘ud failed to comply with this programme, Hogarth had recom­
mended that further action, including denunciation of the Anglo-
Najd treaty and a blockade of his ports on the Gulf coast, could be
threatened.
Curzon shared Wingate’s opposition to Philby’s proposal for a
boundary commission, although he recognized that the British
Government was committed eventually to delimit the Najd-Hijaz
border. But, sensitive to considerations of prestige, Curzon ‘objec­
ted to having our hands forced in this way’. He also saw no
immediate prospect of success for such a commission in view of
Husayn’s persistent refusal to consider the idea. Still, while rejec­
ting Philby’s position, Curzon did not accept the Wingate-Hogarth
proposal that the British Government should apply extreme
pressure on Ibn Sa‘ud to oust him from Khurmah. Unlike the
Egyptian authorities, Curzon was not inclined to prejudge the ulti­
mate disposition of the disputed territory in favour of the Hijaz.
Furthermore, he disliked the idea of threatening Ibn Sa‘ud, because
this tactic would risk alienating him from the British Government.
Curzon therefore recommended that the conference simply
reaffirm the decision of its earlier meeting in January which did not
side firmly with either party. Essentially Curzon’s decision was a
compromise between the widely divergent views of the partisans of
both camps. While it did not establish the boundary commission
which Philby wanted, it also did not compel Ibn.Sa‘ud to abandon
the disputed territory under the threat of severe retaliation which
the Egyptian officials advocated. As Curzon summarised the situa­
tion, ‘Our position was that, if they choose to fight about Khurma,
and in and about Khurma, they might do so without interference
from us. But if Ibn Saud carried the fighting farther into what we
regarded as the Hejaz proper, then we would step in.’ Both Ibn
Sa‘ud and Husayn were to be informed of this decision, and the
necessary instructions were dispatched to Baghdad and Cairo two
days later on 26 February 1919.52
Key British officials both in Egypt and in Mesopotamia imme­
diately protested against the decision of the conference. In Cairo
Clayton complained that the proposed message merely reiterated a
policy which already had failed to produce a solution. Moreover,