Page 52 - Arabian Studies (V)

42 Arabian Studies V
1918, Philby, the British agent in Najd, urged the British Govern­
ment to restrain the Sharif from further attacks against Khurmah.
Philby pointed out that public feeling in Najd was enraged by what
were considered acts of both territorial aggression and religious
persecution. Ibn Sa‘ud would not be able indefinitely to prevent
militant Ikhwan units in Najd from going to the assistance of their
brethren at Khurmah. In such an event, Philby believed that Ibn
Sa‘ud would place himself at the head of the advance, thereby
significantly widening the dimensions of a conflagration which
threatened to make a shambles of the British Government’s war­
time Arab policy. Philby also mentioned that Ibn Sa‘ud wanted
Britain to make a detailed examination of the merits of the issue
and then, in accordance with article one of the Anglo-Najd treaty
of December 1915, demarcate and guarantee the disputed border
between Najd and the Hijaz. Although Ibn Sa‘ud was convinced
that Khurmah was rightfully his territory, he said that he was
willing to abide by the judgment of an impartial British commission.
Philby endorsed Ibn Sa‘ud*s proposal and suggested that if wartime
conditions prevented an immediate adjudication of the dispute, a pro­
visional boundary should be drawn placing Khurmah in Najd.27
During the summer of 1918 the British officials in Mesopotamia
and in the India Office supported Philby’s view that Husayn should
be instructed to abstain from further advance towards Khurmah in
order to prevent a renewed outbreak of hostilities. The Baghdad
authorities contended that Philby’s ‘account seems to clear Ibn
Saud of charge of aggressive action. Suggest that pressure should
now be brought on Sharif to maintain peace, as conflict with
Akhwan elements would seriously compromise efforts against
Turks’.28 John Shuckburgh, Secretary of the Political Department
at the India Office, wrote that the most pressing need at the moment
was to induce Husayn to postpone the dispatch of troops to
Khurmah.29 Sir Arthur Hirtzel suggested that the British Govern­
ment should remind the Sharif that it did not subsidize him for
adventures of this sort.30 Hirtzel also pointed out that Husayn’s
attempt to control Khurmah was necessarily a serious threat to
Najd, because ‘from Bin Saud’s point of view it is as though the
I French were to claim to restore order in Alsace without entertaining
'
hostile designs against Germany’.31
The influence of the Egyptian officials was decisive in determin­
ing British policy on the Khurmah question. On 15 August 1918, in
response to Ibn Sa‘ud’s request that Britain arbitrate his quarrel
l with Husayn, the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet resolved
that Philby should inform Ibn Sa‘ud that ‘it is impossible to decide
upon merits of individual cases [i.e., Khurmah] until precise limits

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