Page 48 - Arabian Studies (V)

38 Arabian Studies V
Cairo and still a key British official in Egypt, reported that ‘He
[Husayn] both fears Ibn Saoud as a centre of a religious movement,
dangerous to the Hedjaz, and hates him as irreconcilable to his own
pretension to be “King of the Arabs”.’5 In September 1918 Husayn
wrote ‘I consider it of vital importance that His Majesty’s Govern­
ment should compel the Emir Ibn Saud to abolish and disperse
what he calls the Ikhwan.’6 And in July 1919 Faysal stressed that
‘the Wahabites should be killed, however successful other measures
might prove ... I want the Wahabites to be crushed by the sword
and not by threats ... the Wahabite movement is a danger both
now and in the future and should be rooted out at once.’7
Husayn precipitated a crisis in the summer of 1917 when he
attempted to displace the Amir of Khurmah, Khalid b. Luway,
and the leading Qadi Gudge), because they were propagating
Ikhwan doctrine. Khalid thereupon revolted and declared his alle­
giance to Ibn Sa‘ud. Husayn considered the rebellion an intolerable
affront to his authority and prestige, both as Sharif of Mecca and
as prospective leader of a larger Arab state or confederation. He
also was concerned about the danger of further Ikhwan conver­
sions among his tribes, because this change naturally would lead to
the defection of the tribe to Ibn Sa‘ud. Consequently, Husayn was
determined to crush the rebellion at Khurmah. In May 1918 he
dispatched an expedition to capture the oasis, but in early June this
force was defeated decisively by Khalid without assistance from Ibn
Sa‘ud. In July Husayn sent another expedition to Khurmah, but
this force met the same fate as its predecessor. Ibn Sa‘ud now was
subjected to strong public pressure to aid his followers at Khurmah
in their efforts to resist the imposition of Sharifian rule. He
realized, however, that hostilities with Husayn would place him in
opposition to Britain and possibly jeopardize the valuable subsidy
of £5,000 per month which he was receiving from the British
Government. Therefore, acting on the advice of Philby, the British
agent in Najd, Ibn Sa‘ud informed Khalid that he would ask
Britain to restrain the Sharif from further attacks on Khurmah,
and that meanwhile Khalid should maintain a strictly defensive
pos.‘ure and refrain from any forward movement towards the
Hijaz.8
The British officials in Egypt, who were instrumental in organis­
ing Husayn’s revolt against the Turks in 1915-16, supported their
protege in his efforts to recapture the disputed territory. Although
both the Sharif and Ibn Sa‘ud were allied with Britain, the Cairo
authorities* believed that Husayn was making a greater
•In this article phrases like ‘Cairo authorities’, ‘Mesopotamian officials’ are used to
i mean British officials in those places as distinct from those in Whitehall itself.
.

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