Page 50 - Arabian Studies (V)

40 Arabian Studies V
Arabian Peninsula. In exchange, the Egyptian officials expected
the Sharif to be guided by the wishes of the British Government in
matters of external policy. They believed that this arrangement
would establish and consolidate British influence throughout the
region, thereby promoting the security of the Suez Canal and of the
western approaches to India. It also would compensate Husayn for
the assistance which he had given Britain during the war. The Cairo
authorities calculated that Husayn would be amenable to British
and French rule in the northern Arab lands if his authority in
Arabia were strengthened significantly.
In 1917 and 1918 the Egyptian officials argued strongly for the
implementation of what became known as the ‘suzertainty policy*.
Colonel Wilson at Jedda believed that ‘All our efforts, therefore,
should now be directed towards getting King Hussein recognized as
Suzerain by the Arab Chiefs.*14 Commander Hogarth suggested
that ‘we should recognize (or, at least, pledge ourselves to King
Husein to favour and promote the ultimate recognition of) a wider
royal title.’15 Colonel Cornwallis maintained that ‘we should do all
we can to recompense him [Husayn] for the help he has given us in
the War, by aiding him to make good his position in Arabia.’16
General Clayton proposed that the British Government should
‘inform King Hussein definitely that their policy in regard to
Central and Southern Arabia is directed towards Arab Unity under
a Suzerain authority* and that ‘His Majesty’s Government would
welcome King Hussein as Suzerain.*17 Sir Reginald Wingate noted
that ‘the adhesion of a number of Arab chieftains to the Sherif’s
Government will tend to secure that semblance of national solid­
arity in the Arabian peninsula which alone can justify to the
Moslem world the Sherif’s action in casting off allegiance to the
Government of the Caliph*.18 The High Commissioner believed
that British assistance ‘should enable the King to make good to the
extent of becoming primus inter pares with the other Arabian
Chiefs’.19 Finally, Wingate proposed that Husayn be informed that
‘the first step towards this [Arabian unity] would be by an alliance
between the Arab chiefs under the leadership of one of them* and
that ‘His Majesty’s Government consider King Husein to be the
best fitted to assume the leadership of the Alliance, and would
welcome him in that capacity’.20
A key obstacle to the implementation of the suzertainty policy
which the Cairo authorities usually overlooked or under-rated in
importance was Ibn Sa‘ud’s determination not to subordinate
himself to Husayn. The British officials in Mesopotamia and the
Gulf, who were in direct contact with the Najdl ruler, and their
superiors in the Government of India and in the India Office in