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Me represented a minor business, the EGS, which was unlike APOC, an established semi­
official and large economic concern. The denigration of‘trade” was particularly common in
the officers of the select Indian Political Service (referred to as “picked men, picked from
picked men") 17 who served as political officers in the Gulf States where I-Iohnes worked.

The attitude that “trade” was almost beneath government consideration pervaded British
oil policy in the remaining Gulf states following the conclusion of the Kuwait concession. After
that, the main British concern was to seal off the rest of the area from the American companies
rather than to obtain long-term financial gain for British companies. The rulers of Qatar and
the seven Trucial States were issued with strict orders from the Political Resident that oil
concessions could only be signed with a subsidiary of the 1PC. Despite the discovery of oil in
Bahrain, no serious British consideration was given to a corresponding discovery elsewhere.
The main concern of the Political Resident at the time was how to exclude American business
interests. 18 Yet the British oil company was slow to acquire concessions in these states even
though the Political Resident and Political Agent had so efficiently paved the way for it. By
1937, the Political Resident had become impatient of the excuses made by the company for its
lack of progress, arguing that it was not seriously aiming for a commerical agreement, and said
of it that: “Invidious comparisons arc drawn between what they (the oil company) do, or
rather not do, and what tfifc Americans actually carry out.M |Q

John BulPs Face: 1932-1939

In 1938, an article by Jerome Beatty entitled “Is John Bull’s Face Red”appeared in The
American Magazine. It was written in the form of an expose about an “embarassing British
secret — how Americans beat them to a faraway island of oil” (Bahrain). Beatty would have
been surprised to learn that the great commercial success of BAPOC, which had a profit of $ 8
million in 1938, did not seem to worry those British officials in charge of Bahrain and the other
Gulf states. Their overriding concern was how not to lose political control to the Americans.

Within a month of the signing of the SoCal Hasa concession, the Political Agent in
Bahrain expressed his concern that the US government might one day soon want to establish a
consular office in Bahrain. He was firm in his belief that “ it would be most undesirable to have
a Consul of the United States of America in Bahrain, as with the oil interests at his back, he
would be likely rapidly to acquire a powerful position — indeed, he might well tend to supplant
the Political Agent”.20 He had, in fact anticipated American wishes by one decade.

The position of the Political Agent in Bahrain was governed by the second clause of the
1892 Exclusive Agreement whereby Bahrain undertook not to assent to the residence there of
any but the representative of the British government. As such, therefore, he was the only
foreign representative and, after the 1919 Order-in-Council, he was empowered to exercise
: jurisdiction over all foreigners. Before World War I, the Ottoman, German, Russian and
French governments had sought to establish representation in Bahrain, but “these intrigues
have been successfully resisted”.21 After the war, the Persian, Iraqi and Saudi governments
expressed an interest in having consular offices there; and Britain once again, refused to
sanction them.

« Although no population census of Bahrain during the 1930s was taken, it can be assumed
! that roughly 18% of the population consisted of foreigners.22 These were Indians (and
i therefore British subjects), Iranians and Omanis. There was no Western community to speak

of, apart from the Political Agent, the Advisor, the Director of Customs, the Police Chief and
the American missionaries. But after BAPCO started operations, the American community

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