Page 56 - DILMUN 12

The third factor was the entry of the US into the war after Pearl Harbour. The Gulf, and
norc especially Saudi Arabia, became of great strategic importance for Allied supply lines and
lir routes. The importance of oil as a vital weapon in the conduct of war also began to be
icknowlcdgcd, particularly in 1943, when the military and naval campaigns in the Far East
verc growing. This time, the major US Departments—of War, of Navy, of the Interior, and of
State — agreed that active oil diplomacy was of national importance, $nd that the protection
uul development of Arab oil was too important to be left entirely to the private sector.33

It was at this time that the Department of State, and, in particular, its Division of Near
Eastern Affairs, began to work successfully towards a forward policy in the Gulf and Saudi
Arabia. The old attitudes had changed: Roosevelt declared Saudi Arabia vital to the defence
of the USA, and made it eligible for lend-lcasc.34 For the first time, Britain was perceived as
the strong rival for the implementation of the new policy.

Anglo-American rivalry in the Gulf now began in earnest. There were two main fronts:
on the diplomatic level, and in the field. It must be noted here, however, that the two countries
were close allies throughout the war, and cordial relations between them did not falter. But the
British wanted to strengthen its hold on the region; and the Americans wanted to undermine
that hold in order to make inroads of influence.

Once the tension between the two governments was recognised, efforts to rationalise the
relationship were made. A major landmark in this process were the Anglo-American conver­
sations on the Middle East which were held in London in April 1944.

In preparation for the talks, the British War Cabinet circulated a Confidential War Paper
in July 1943 setting out British policy in the area, and drafting a memorandum on this policy to
be presented to the Americans.35 Since British policy in the Gulf was included, a copy was duly
circulated to the Government of India. The reaction of the Viceroy to the paper was swift and
angry: he was furious at the acknowledgement of American ambitions in the region and only
saw as a sign of weakness the fact that a British policy statement should be given to them. He
was particularly worried about a recent American request that a US consulate be established
in Bahrain; this the Government of India found totally unacceptable. He also insisted that
Britain “ought to pitch as high as possible” regarding the Gulf, rather than understate its
position there. 36

But the Foreign Office did not agree : “.... nothing is more likely to induce the Americans
to take their own line in the Middle East than the Government of India’s proposal that we
should stick our toes in and refuse everything”.37 The Foreign Office attitude won through,
though not without certain changes to the text that were suggested by the India Office in
liaison with the Government of India. The British position in the Gulf, for example, was
explained more thoroughly and in greater, detail.38

As the date for the talks drew nearer, their importance became more urgent. An exchange
of telegrams between Churchill and Roosevelt illustrates the fears of both sides. Churchill
appealed to the US President in February 1944 that there were misgivings in Britain “that the
United States has a desire to deprive us of our oil assets in the Middle East on which among
other things, the whole supply of our Navy depends”.39 Roosevelt explained his side of the
problem. “I am disturbed about the rumor that the British wish to horn in our Saudi Arabian
oil reserves.” 40 A compromise was reached when»Roosevelt was able to reassure Churchill
that “we are not making sheep’s eyes at your oilfields in Iraq, or Iran”.41

49