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I lie difficulties lie encountered with British officials were carefully put. It was clear to him
that they did not allow themselves “to forget that one of their basic long-term tasks is to
prevent any foreign power from attaining a position of influence in the Persian Gulf
area.”63 Me described the skill and tact they displayed in carrying out their duties in the face of
growing American prestige, and concluded that they clearly did not wish to give offense to the
U.S. Although they were deeply concerned about the American threat, “this concern docs not
necessarily reflect anti-American feelings on their part. On the contrary, I am convinced that
many of these officials arc genuinely friendly towards the United States and Americans...’’64
What annoyed Henderson particularly was what appeared to have been changes in British
attitudes according to the fortunes of the* war. Between 1939 and 1942, when the British
Empire was “tottering’’, for example, British officals in Bahrain were exceptionally friendly
and informal to the American oil representatives; when the tide of war changed after 1942,
they “reverted to their former attitude of a somewhat stiff but correct politeness’’.65

Henderson’s visit took place just before the Anglo-American conversations, when the
rivalry between the two countries was at its most acute. Once the war was over, a little more
than a year later, American policy became directed to what it perceived as the growing Soviet
threat internationally; in the Gulf, this became focused on Russian activity in Iran, particularly
after the Tudeh Party made statements regarding the status of Bahrain. And here Anglo-
American cooperation was important, for by now the US government became less interested
in altering Britain’s position in the Gulf because of the risk that that would open the door to
Russia.

The British Government of India, of course, was about to be dissolved, and control of
Gulf affairs was about to be transferred to the Foreign Office. American policy-makers could
with relief point out that the obstructionist tactics of Anglo-Indian officials would end soon,
and London could always be relied on to solve any differences that might arise between British
and American officials in the field.

The end of the war also brought with it the realisation that Arab oil resources were so
large that they could accommodate the interests of both the USA and Britain. The zero-sum-
game implied in the exchange of telegrams between Churchill and Roosevelt in 1944 was
superseded.

American policy in the Gulf, then, had six main thrusts: (1) to encourage the US
missionaries in every way; (2) to support American commercial interests; (3) to cooperate
with British officials in order to promote US business interests; (4) to refer to London any
outstanding differences between Britain and the USA; (5) to establish consulates in Bahrain
and Muscat; and (6) to refrain from any measures which would open the area to Russian
penetration.66

The third and fourth points above indicate the strength of Britain’s position. Its main
interest in the Gulf had always been strategic, not commercial. The fact that it had been able to
withstand American pressures during the years from 1939 to 1945 when American resources
had been so vital to the conduct of the war attests to its ability to maintain the status quo. The
political order it had created in the Gulf for over a century remained unchanged despite the
dynamics of the changing economic situation. Once again, the pax brittanica prevailed.

1. Qatar was the last Gulf state to have signed a treaty with Britain. This was done in 1916.

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