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would be most unwise to under-rate him or anyone like him.”5* Although their personal
relations were very good, the Political Agent was deeply suspicious of Sands’ ulterior objec­
tives. I Ie had told the Political Agent more than once that “he has such a lot to do here — and
he certainly has — or he makes a great fuss about doing what he has to do!”. The Agent was
worried that the American’s next move — “at least I would do so in his place” — would be to
convince his government that a US consulate in Bahrain was necessary.57

The suspicions continued. Other aspects of the American presence in Bahrain were
! regarded as potentially destructive to British dominance. The US'Army Transport Corps, for

example, had 270 men stationed in Bahrain, and a further 53 in Sharjah. Although they were
there to deal with the war traffic, the Agent was convinced that American civil airlines

1 intended to use Bahrain’s important landing grounds after the war; he suggested that the

British Overseas Airways Corporation introduce a service between Bahrain and Dhahran to
pre-empt a possible American attempt.58 Another indication of the American presence
worried the Agent. The US Air Force had established an elaborate system of W/T communica­
tion and Direction Finding at Bahrain and Sharjah. Although they were housed in RAF
buildings, the installations were the property of the USA. The Agent was sure that the US
government would object to dismantling them once the war was over. “They (US airmen)
have come and they will take a great deal of removing.”59 The Agent was particularly incensed
at the lack of action by a British company. Cable and Wireless Ltd., who were about to lose
( their communications monopoly in Saudi Arabia to the Americans because of their sluggish
response to demand; a US company was going to erect for the Saudi government a receiving
station at Dhahran connecting it directly with the USA after Cable and Wireless had claimed
such an establishment to be technically impossible. The Agent rather bitterly urged that unless
Britain was careful “we shall find ourselves playing second fiddle under a trans-Atlantic
conductor.”60

Pax Brittanica Prevails

But the suspicions were not one-sided. Although the British officials were constantly
worried about the possibility of their waning power, there can be no doubt that, in the words of
William Sands, “the British always have the last word.’’61 They were able to contain and slow
down the process of American penetration despite the enormous economic interests of the
USA in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. An important document, written in the form of a report by
the American Minister in Baghdad, Loy Henderson, to the Department of State following a
trip to the Gulf in March 1944 reflects the attitude of American officials.62

Henderson visited Basra and Fao first, then Kuwait, Bahrain and Dhahran. He had
wanted to go on from there to Qatar and the Trucial States, but was prevented by what he
referred to euphemistically as “difficulties of communication”; it is more likely, however, that
British officials in the Gulf, who had never allowed any Westerners (except missionary
doctors) into the Trucial States, strongly dissuaded him from going. They also kept him under
close observation. In Basra, for example, he met freely with leading Iraqis, but in Kuwait and
Bahrain his meetings with the rulers took place in the presence of the respective Political
Agents who also acted as interpreters.

Henderson was able to obtain considerable information on the Gulf States during his
tour. It must be noted here that this information was not readily available, in view of Britain’s
policy of carefully controlling all intelligence on the region. Whe ther the British officials or the
American missionaries provided it is difficult to ascertain, but the report is one of the first
manifestations of American understanding of the internal and external positions of the Gulf
States.

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