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The talks opened on 12 April 1944. The American delegation was led by Wallace
Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs at the Department of
State. The British delegation had Sir Maurice Peterson, Under Secretary of State of the
Foreign Office, at its head. 'Flic discussions, which lasted over two weeks, covered many
countries which were considered as being in the “Middle East” : Egypt, Ethiopia, Palestine,
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, Iran, and Afghanistan.

The discussions concerning Bahrain revolved around the American wish to establish a
consulate there. Unofficial voicing of this request had been made to the Foreign Office in
1943. But the latter had then pointed out that, although they were aware of American interests
in Bahrain, such an establishment would create a precedent; and Britain would not then be
able to refuse similar requests from Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This viewpoint was repeated
during the conversations when Peterson suggested that the US Consul in Dhahran be
authorised to go to Bahrain whenever necessary to perform consular duties there; he added
that the British government had no objection to this procedure so long as it did not have to
issue an official exequator.42

There was little Murray could do to find fault with this argument, so at the next meeting he
tried to approach the same issue from another angle. He voiced his concern about the matter of
criminal jurisdication over Americans in Bahrain at a time when around 2,000 oil drillers and
construction workers — “who were not famous for their gentlemanly behavior” — would be
going there.4} Peterson, in reply, pointed out that the Political Agent in Bahrain had already
appointed four American and four British constables under his authority, and that, if so
requested, more could be obtained. With reference to jurisdiction in criminal cases where
Americans were involved, the Political Agent, who applied the Indian Code of Criminal
Procedure, suggested that either an American assessor sit with him in hearings or that
American jurymen be selected.

Murray accepted the fact that the US Consul in Dhahran would provide facilities in
Bahrain, thus also accepting the powerful British position there. In most other issues discussed
at the conversation, the Foreign Office was able to convince the Department of State of the
validity of its policies, at the same time acknowledging the recent growth of American
interests, particularly where oil was concerned.

They reflect an interesting milestone in a dynamic process. The Department of State was
hesitant and naive in its attitudes,44 but backed up by its tremendous economic power. The
Foreign Office realised that the world had changed, together with Britain’s future role in it. It
understood that a certain amount of give and take was necessary in its relationship with the
( USA,45 but was not prepared to give more than absolutely necessary. The result was a policy of
delaying tactics.

The proposed Consulate in Bahrain

It may be worthwhile here to point out the significance of wanting to establish a consulate
in Bahrain in 1944. For it was not a simple case, as it would bo- today, of adding one
representative office to other, similar offices. For it was not a routine establishment. It was
very complex, and, in effect, aimed to undermine the extraordinary British hold over Bahrain.
i This hold was governed by the position of the Political Agent whose many roles-included being
the only representative of a foreign government with whom the ruler and government of
Bahrain had contact; as such, he controlled Bahrain’s foreign relations. By the Order-in-
Council of 1919, the Agent had jurisdiction over all foreigners in the country, and he also sat as

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