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*5. Details of this event available in (IOR), R/15/2/518
-6. (IOR), R/15/2/855: Political Agent to Politial Resident, 18 March 1934.
27. Knabenshue worked closely with the British authorities in Iraq and was rarely personally suspected of
anti-British behaviour. In April 1941, when Rashid Ali came to power, he smuggled the pro-British
Regent Abdulillah out of Baghdad, hidden under rugs in his car. See Freya Stark, East is West,
London, 1947, pp. 139-40.
28. (IOR), R/15/2/854: Political Agent, Bahrain, to Political Resident, 1 July 1933.
29. (IOR), R/l 5/2/1361. US Consul, Baghdad, to Political Agent, Bahrain, 26 January 1936.
30. Available in (IOR), R/15/2/1361.
* 1 Roosevelt, in a letter to the oil company, declared: "Will you tell the British I hope they can take care
of the King of Saudi-Arabia. This is a little far afield for us!" Quoted in Aaron David Miller, Search
for Security, p.44.
32 Ibid, p.45
33 Ibid, p.63. For the various government efforts to secure control of CASOC in 1943, sec ibid,
pp.76-82, and pp.96-99.
34 Ibid, p.70.
35 Available at (PRO), FO 371/34975, Confidential WP (43), 301, 12 July 1943.
36 (PRO), FO 371/34976: E6065/2551/65: Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 9 October 1943
(telegram).
37 Minute by H.M. Eyers in ibid.
38 An amusing note regarding these changes concerned the use of the words‘‘exclusive treaty relations"
in the India Office amendment. The Foreign Office struck off the word "exclusive" as being a "bad
word for the Yanks" and substituted ‘‘special" instead. (PRO), F0371/34976: E6481/2551/65.
Enclosure in India Office to Foreign Office, 27 October 1943.
39 Quoted in D.A. Miller, Search for Security, pp.101-2
40 Ibid, p.102.
41 Ibid.
42 For details of this particular conversation, see National Archives, Washington DC, (henceforth, NA)
740.0011 Stettinius Mission/127: Memorandum of Conversation, 12 April 1944.
43 Ibid, 14 April 1944.
44 This is reflected in the account prepared by the Department of State of the conversations, particularly
when compared with the Foreign Office account. The former was written in a personal and informal
manner, jokes were recorded, slang expressions used, etc. The Foreign Office document, by contrast,
was formal and highly institutionalised.
45 Here it contrasted sharply with the attitude of the Government of India which wanted to block the
USA even out of policy talks. The Foreign Office dismissed such an outlook as "wholly eighteenth
century”. '
46 (IOR), R/l5/1/377: Political Agent, Bahrain, to Political Resident, 21 April 1943.
47 It is interesting to point out here that despite all the thought and effort devoted to considering the US
request fora consulate, the ruler of Bahrain was never informed of this request. (IOR), R/15/1/377:
India Office to Political Resident, 16 June 1943 (telegram).
48 (IOR), R/15/2/538: Political Agent to Political Resident 1 March 1945. Emphasis mine.
49 Ibid.
50 (IOR), R/15/1/377: Political Resident to India Office, 22 November 1944.
51 (IOR), R/15/1/377: Political Agent to Political Resident, 2 November 1944.
52 (IOR), R/15/1/377: Political Resident to India Office, 22 November 1944.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 (IOR), R/15/2/538: Political Agent to Political Resident, 11 July 1945.
56 Ibid.
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