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started to grow, albeit within the confines of the conditions ofthe concession. In January 1935,
there were 24 Americans in Bahrain; in January 1936, this figure had grown to 49; and by the
end of 1936, it had become 121. The next year there were 153 Americans working for
BAPCO in Bahrain.” The substantial increase registered during the period from 1936 to 1938
was because the refinery was being built, and no suitable British engineers for the job could be
found. After that, the numbers declined: in 1939, they were 91: in 1940 they were 67; in 1941,
they were 55; in 1942, they were 34; and in 1943, they were 32.24

But even informal visits of US officials to Bahrain aroused the suspicions of the British
government, despite the friendliness of British officers in the field. In 1925, the US Vice-
Consul in Bushirc visited Bahrain and stayed with the Political Agent. He was closely watched
by the latter who concluded there was no evidence of his having indulged in consular activities.

Another visit, this time in 1934, clearly illustrates the panic of the Political Agent at
possible American encroachments. In late November, he received a telegram from the British
Consul in Baghdad that he had issued a visa to Bahrain to a Mr. Harding of the American
Express Company. The Agent assumed that Harding was an American who wanted to open a
branch of American Express in Bahrain. He decided to prevent him from entering the country.
He tried to send him a cable to Iraq, telling him not to proceed, but the cable was too late in
reaching him. So the Agent went to the Bahrain airport and prepared to send Harding back
immediately after his plane landed. To his surprise and relief, he discovered that Harding was
British; since an Englishman did not warrant expulsion, the Political Agent allowqd him in.25

The panic caused by American visists to Bahrain had increased because of the BAPCO
concession. Moreover, the US Consul in Baghad had made it clear to the Political Agent that
he considered Bahrain as being within his consular sphere, and in 1931 made his first visit
there. The Consul stayed at the American mission, thus underlining the separateness of
Britain and the USA.

The second visit, this time of Paul Knabenshue, US Minister in Baghdad, was viewed with
great alarm, not only by the Political Resident and Agent, but also by the officials of the India
Office in London. Knabenshue was on an official visit to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman to
celebrate the centenary of the US-Muscat Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and made various
stops along the way. His every move was followed by British officials. He went to Bahrain in
March 1934 and stayed with the Chief Local Representative of BAPCO. Although he and the
Political Agent enjoyed good, personal and friendly relations, the Agent became increasingly
suspicious of American designs in the Gulf. He noted that the US official had planned to visit
King Abdel Aziz in Riyadh from Bahrain and that he was to be accompanied there by an
American missionary. But the Agent had not been told beforehand ofthe visit, and was furious
that the American missionaries had kept it a secret from him. He voiced his fears about what
he perceived as the growing involvement of the missionaries, seeing as totally inappropriate
the fact that they were being drawn “whether in fact or in the eyes of the local people, into the
political arena” 26 He was particularly worried about the fact that, as doctors, they had access
to places and people which he did not have; and as such could “make mischief’ for Britain. His
misgivings were strengthened by a remark made by Knabenshue during his visit: that during
the Assyrian troubles in Iraq, the US Minister had obtained intelligence from the American
missionaries for the British Air Officer Commanding in Iraq when other sources of informa­
tion had not been available.27

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