Page 112 - Arabiab Studies (IV)

102 Arabian Studies IV
Farasan and Zuqar should be seized and held by the British Navy
as bases for patrols. The Turkish flag on Kamanin should, he
argued, be lowered, and the quarantine officials be relieved of their
posts as Turkish officials and reappointed as officials of the British
occupied quarantine stations.98 India had always made its views
clear against an occupation of Kamaran. Such action, argued the
Viceroy, might be ‘interpreted as a design on our part against the
pilgrim traffic’ and would, moreover, necessitate the installation of
a British quarantine station. ‘We are of opinion that it would, to
begin with, be best to leave that place alone.’99
Early in 1915 Britain was negotiating for the conclusion of a
treaty with Sayyid Muhammad al-ldrisl who had seized a
considerable tract of territory in ‘Aslr and the Tihamah from the
Turks. The delicate nature of these discussions further convinced
the Viceroy that military operations against Kamaran were ‘not
desirable’—they might alarm the Idris! and antagonise his
subjects.100 A week later Hardinge, the Viceroy, argued that Port
Sudan would provide Britain with a better base than Kamaran for
the surveillance of Jeddah.101
Italy’s entry into the war complicated the position of the Red
Sea islands yet further: the Foreign Office feared that Italian
participation in the war would now afford them an excuse to
occupy Farasan, Kamaran and Zuqar islands and so, on 27 May
1915, the Viceroy was asked to forward his views on an immediate
British occupation of those islands—a measure to forestall similar
action by Italy.102 Hardinge replied, ‘It is regarded by us of the
utmost importance that Italy should not be allowed to get a
foothold on the Eastern coast of the Red Sea, or in the islands
adjacent ... under any circumstances whatever, and in the first
instance we strongly recommend free interchange of views between
the Government of Italy and His Majesty’s Government on the
question of these islands ... so as to obviate the necessity on our
part of any action not required definitely by the exigencies of war
with Turkey. If such an interchange of views does not meet with
approval ... with regard to Camaran ... we recognise that
changed conditions may necessitate this [occupation of Kamaran].
If such is the case, we might offer desire to facilitate pilgrimage as
pretext for temporary occupation. .. .’,03
In reply Hardinge was told that the British Government was
‘impressed by necessity of anticipating any possible action by Italy’
and considered an agreement with Italy as ‘impracticable’, thus
leaving no alternative but a British occupation of Kamaran and
other islands.104 On 7 June ‘one double company and one company
of the 109th Infantry: two Platoons British Infantry; four Sections