Page 113 - Arabiab Studies (IV)
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Foreign Interventions and Occupations of Kamaran /.     103
       machine guns; and two 15-pr guns’ were embarked on the Empress
       of India in Aden harbour. ‘Of these a half company of the 109th,
       together with one section machine guns, to be placed on Zukor,
       ditto on Hanish and the rest on Kamaran’.105 Three days later the
       landings had successfully taken place. On Kamaran the population
       and European officials on the island welcomed the British landing.
       The eight principal Turkish officials found on the island were
       taken to Aden, and a temporary military administration was
       established under Major Feliowes as Chief Political and Military
       Officer. Richardson, formerly vice-consul at Kamaran and al-
       Hudaydah was made Political Assistant.106
          Indeed, British apprehensions concerning Italian aspirations to
       the eastern shore of the Red Sea and the adjacent islands were not
       unfounded. Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador to Rome, reported
       on a small minority of Italian ‘nationalists’ who were ‘endeavouring
       to demonstrate that the Yemen from its geographical position
       opposite the Italian colony [of Eritrea] should become a sort of
        Italian reserve to be exploited commercially and in fact regarded as
        an eventual sphere of influence’.107 The Foreign Office shared these
        fears: ‘Here and in India we always regard with suspicion Italian
        contentions in the Red Sea ... and we have no intention of
        allowing them under any pretext to get over to the eastern
        coast. ... It was on account of the danger from Italian aspirations
        that we hoisted our flag, nearly a year ago, on some of the islands
        in the Red Sea in order that we might be able to say that we had a
        claim to them in case anybody else—such as Italy—should
        endeavour to appropriate them. ...’,08 The British occupation of
        Kamaran was, then, undertaken less as a hostile action against the
        enemy Turkey, but rather to prevent an ally from gaining
        influence.
          Britain established a blockade along the eastern coast of the Red
        Sea to prevent supplies getting through to Turkish ports. In the
        southern Red Sea only the Idris! port of Midi (for which Jlzan was
        later substituted) was exempt from the blockade. Foreign govern­
        ments were informed by Britain that their dhows plying to Midi
        were to report to the Port Officer at Kamaran: any vessel
        transgressing this order would be detained.109
          Britain reactivated the quarantine station in 1917 as a result of
        the inefficiency of King Husayn’s quarantine arrangements at
        Jeddah.110 The next year the quarantine station was closed, but,
        from 1919 until its transfer to Jeddah in 1956, the quarantine
        station at Kamaran was administered by Britain.
          With the end of World War I there arose the thorny problem for
        Britain of the sovereignty of former Turkish possessions in Arabia.
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