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The Preliminary Oil Concessions: 123

see Abu Dhabi getting a good knock on the head'.79 Although
he conceded that the evidence against Shakhbut was ‘a little lacking
in precision’, R. T. Peel, Assistant Secretary of the Political Depart­
ment, thought that security considerations made a strong ease for
taking a tough line.80 So Fowlc’s suggestions were circulated to
the Admiralty, the Foreign Office and the Government of India,
all of which agreed to them.
In the meantime Fowlc went on leave to London, where he
discussed the whole problem of Abu Dhabi with the India Office.
YVciglitman, who officiated as Resident during bis absence, reported
that Ahmad bin Khalaf bin ‘Utaybah, one of the most influential
men of Abu Dhabi and related by marriage to Khalifah bin Zayid,
Shakhbut’s venerable old uncle, had told the Residency Agent that
he could negotiate the concession in ten days. Weightman did
not trust Ahmad bin Khalaf, but he did not discount the possibility
that Ahmad’s claim signified that Shakhbut had had a change
of heart.81 After his meeting at the India Office, Fowlc was inclined
to agree that it would be foolish to enrage Shakhbut by inflicting
any form of punishment on him; he felt that the wisest course
would be to stay action until Petroleum Concessions had made
a fresh approach to the shaykh.
The policy proved successful, for in the first few days of 1939,
and in face of the British stand on slave-trading, Shakhbut’s
resistance crumbled. He agreed to negotiate with Petroleum Conces­
sions, and Longrigg went to Abu Dhabi to conclude an agreement.
He took with him a letter from the Political Agent in Bahrain
that reaffirmed Fowle’s ultimatum of Petroleum Concessions or noth­
ing, should Shakhbut need a reminder.82 After an especially difficult
time, during which his entire* family helped to convince him, Shakh­
but signed, on 11 January 1939, a commercial agreement for seven­
ty-five years.83 Longrigg reported that one of the main reasons
why the ruler of Abu Dhabi had finally consented to commit
himself to Petroleum Concessions was his ‘hope that an agreement
would be gratifying to the Political authorities, whose better opinion
he would gladly have.’84 Fowle was delighted. He regarded the
letter that Longrigg took with him as the best proof of his own
policy. ‘I have always held the view . . . that once the shaikhs
were convinced that His Majesty’s Government were in earnest
as to their “ultimatum” they would come to terms.’85 Apparently,
however, Longrigg kept the letter in his pocket and did not show
it to Shakhbut.86
The two remaining shaykhdoms, Ajman and Umm al-Qaivvain,
had no territory of possible interest to Petroleum Concessions, which
consequently did not approach their rulers. Fowle contested the
wisdom of this, afraid that Socal would try to seize the opportunity