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The Exercise of Power: British Representatives 175
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lives and property of Indian merchants, and for preventing traffic
in arms and slaves and hostilities at sea.38 He was averse to assuming
any new responsibilities, ‘the most important of which would be
the preventing of hostilities between Shaikhs on land, though
whenever opportunity occurs we should give our good offices to
the Rulers for the composition of their differences’.39
The Government of India regarded this ambivalent attitude as
satisfactory, but the Air Ministry, which took an increased and
active interest in the Coast during the 1930s, was opposed to it.
It rejected Fowlc’s passive policy as inadequate, especially in view
of the interest that other countries, such as the United States,
Japan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, were taking in the area;40 it was
worried that Fowlc’s policy would lead to a decline in British
prestige, thus endangering the security of the air route.41 The Govern­
ment of India was not convinced, and remained firm in its view
that the foundation of policy had been laid down by Curzon at
Sharjah in November 1903, and reconfirmed at the durbar of 1933;
furthermore, it recommended that the Air Ministry should limit
its concern to the safety of the air-route.42
Unwilling to accept the peripheral role suggested by the Govern­
ment of India, and anxious to obtain approval for a forward policy,
the Air Ministry called for a meeting of the Middle East (Sub-)Com-
mittcc of the Committee of Imperial Defence. This meeting took
place in September 1935, and was attended by Fowle, who was
then on leave in London. However, despite general agreement that
Britain had to admit ultimate international responsibility for the
Trucial Coast and Qatar, the various Departments proved unable
to agree on much else. A general view of the different positions
taken at the meeting reveals the clash of priorities, as well as
Fowlc’s personal interpretation of what constituted interference.
The Air Ministry asked for a redefinition of non-interference,
claiming that Fowle’s role in the Dubai uprising had been nothing
less than direct involvement. The Foreign Office showed concern
for the far-reaching implications of the new interests on the Coast,
and would have welcomed a more precisely defined policy. But
it was Fowle who remained adamantly opposed to any redefinition,
convinced of the adequacy of the existing policy. He maintained
that it had already shown itself compatible with the obtaining
of concessions, and that there was therefore no reason for change.43
In a private letter to J. G. Laithwaite, Principal at the India
Office, he had already sought to justify his action over Dubai,
and in so doing had stressed his viewpoint on policy:

That it was not a case of abstract principles of ‘intervention’
and ‘non-intervention’, but of gaining the above ends with the
minimum of interference. If we could gain our ends by this