Page 211 - The Origins of the United Arab Emirates_Neat

The Exercise of Power: British Representatives 177

internal situation, and lie never used it for the smaller shaykhdoms,
where few people travelled.
Fowlc was firm about his method of rule. He was impatient
of any signs of insubordination, as he expressed on more than
one occasion. ‘Owing to the suppliant attitude which we have
had inevitably to adopt during the last few years . . . [the Rulers]
have got swollen heads . . . .’,5 He was also pragmatic: he could
dismiss simple facts or overlook logic if it suited his purpose as
Resident and the upholder of British interests. In February 1935,
when Shaykh Shakhbut signed an agreement for the stationing
of a petrol tank at Sir Bani Yas and for the establishment of
a landing ground on the island and near Abu Dhabi, he refused
to allow a petrol store to be built in Abu Dhabi, since this had
not been specifically mentioned in the agreement. Sweeping aside
the qualms of Colonel Loch, the Political Agent in Bahrain, who
was conscious of Shakhbut’s rights, Fowlc informed the ruler that
the store was ‘one of the natural adjuncts’ of a landing ground
and had thus been implicitly included in the agreement. Another
occasion on which Fowlc showed his ability to overlook basic facts
in the face of higher goals occurred in 1938, and again concerned
Shakhbut, who was not easily swayed by demonstrations of power.
In this case the ruler was adamantly refusing to sign an oil concession
agreement, and Fowlc was hard put to find a means of inducing
him to sign. The opportunity presented itself in a third-hand report
on the existence of slave-trading in Abu Dhabi. Almost immediately
Fowlc began to contemplate issuing Shakhbut a strong ultimatum,
which he hoped would have a subduing effect on him and make
him more amenable to Petroleum Concessions. Wcightman was
disturbed by the fact that no concrete evidence of the existence
of slave-trading in Dubai had been established, especially as it
was rumoured on the Coast that the story was being used as
an excuse to censure Shakhbut for his refusal to sign the oil concession.
Fowlc was angry and snapped back that he did not regard local
opinion as of importance, and had no intention of pandering to
it by the production of concrete evidence.
Despite the firmness and efficiency of Fowle’s rule of the Coast,
in 1938 Weightman, as Political Agent in Bahrain, questioned its
wisdom. In support of his belief that British prestige in the Gulf
was declining at a dangerous speed, he cited various recent exam­
ples of disrespect to British officers by the rulers of Sharjah, Ras
al-Khaimah and Abu Dhabi. In view of the possibility that oil
would be found in the shaykhdoms, he strongly urged a redefinition
of policy and the establishment of closer political control, through
more frequent naval patrols, greater expenditure on intelligence
and information services, and the stationing of a British representative