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i7»            The Origins of the United Arab Emirates
               on  tlic Coast.46 Fowlc, however, retained his earlier opinion. He
               disagreed with YVeightman’s assessment, and regarded i(  as unneces-
               sarily pessimistic; besides, he could see no reason for altering official
               policy before oil had been discovered in the area if ever it would
               be. Once again, he made it clear that any alteration in the existing
               policy would necessitate a ‘take-over’ of the Coast.47
                 YVeightman was not convinced. He had been particularly incensed
               that, owing to personal obstruction by the ruler of Abu Dhabi,
               a Petroleum Concessions exploration party sent out to Buraimi
               during the winter of 1938 (with the official blessing of the Political
               Resident) failed to obtain necessary geological data. The Political
               Agent expressed ‘regret that we seem reluctant to use the means
               we possess to deter a crew of feeble but ill-conditioned shaikhs
               from treating the wishes of His Majesty’s Government with quite
               such persistent disrespect’,48 and advocated,

                 let us make it perfectly clear that when we say we want a
                 thing we are going to get it ... and without undue delay;
                 and that obstructive tactics do not pay. . . . We certainly do
                 not want to administer their disgusting territories and people,
                 but if they happen to be on the air route or there is oil underground
                 they have got to behave.49

               Fowle objected and refused to accept this manner of thinking,
               finding the accepted definition of policy adequate. He continual
               to dominate the Coast, using any means he could justify. In 1939,
               for example, following the collapse of the reform movement in
               Dubai, he advised Shaykh Sa‘id to set up an advisory council.
               The India Office questioned the reason for Fowle’s action and
               saw it as a deviation from official policy. Fowle argued that advice
               could hardly be classified as interference, and admitted that he
               felt duty-bound, since Britain ‘put a ring-fence around the Arab
               states adorned with a large “Hands Off” notice board’, to give
               advice and guidance when necessary.50
                 The India Office was annoyed that Fowle had given Shaykh
               Sa‘id advice without consultation. Fowle realised that he had side­
              stepped the normal procedure and admitted, ‘ I quite understand
               the desire of the India Office for reference to be made before
              advice of the kind is given in future cases and have noted this
              point’; but he could not resist adding, in justification of his behaviour,
              that he had been following a precedent set by the British Government
              when it gave its consent to similar advice being given to the
              ruler of Kuwait.51 This was not the first time that the India Office
              had been taken unawares by Fowle. In March 1938, upon hearing
                   revival of the slave trade, he had withdrawn ‘the good offices
              of a
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